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ABSTRACT 
 
David Kar Wor Ma: Explaining Judicial Independence in The East Asian Developmental States: 
The Case of Taiwan 
(Under the direction of Evelyne Huber) 
 
 
Taiwan presents an intriguing case regarding the emergence of judicial independence in new 
democracies since it cannot be conveniently explained by the existing theories. In this paper, I offer a 
model of judicial independence to resolve the puzzle, highlighting the role of private corporations having 
close ties with the government that is characteristic of the East Asian countries. Within this framework, 
despite single party dominance the ruling party is motivated to grant unconditional judicial independence 
to the court, allowing it to effectively check against the growing power of the corporations. It is also 
predicted that the dominant party would pursue strategies that can promote unconditional judicial 
independence by overcoming the credible commitment problem arisen from its unique relation with the 
corporate sector. This would include a three-part solution that involves formal rules, communications 
strategies, and appointment strategies. The theory finds support from an in-depth case study.  
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The rule of law with an independent judiciary is universally recognized as a cornerstone of 
modern democratic societies. In particular, in constitutional democracies, the constitutional document, 
designed to protect basic human rights as well as to define and limit the powers of the government, must 
be upheld by justices who answer to no political masters. As such, constitutional courts whose role is to 
conduct constitutional reviews play an important part in democratic development. Yet, the challenge of 
explaining how the court, which Alexander Hamilton had characterized as having ‘no influence over 
either the sword or the purse’, may actually achieve independence from power-holders remains an 
intriguing question to many political scientists who participated in the ‘judicialization of politics’ research 
agenda during the past decade or so. A lot has been achieved, but still much is yet to be uncovered.  
This paper aims at contributing to the ongoing effort in specifying the conditions and causal 
mechanisms for judicial independence pertaining to constitutional courts in the context of new 
democracies in East Asia, and in particular Taiwan. East Asian countries have so far been very 
understudied regarding this research topic, with the rare exception of Ginsburg who applies the ‘insurance 
theory’ to explain the variation in constitutional court independence in Taiwan, Mongolia, and South 
Korea.1 Moreover, Japan’s poor record of constitutional court independence2 can also be conveniently 
explained by the insurance theory. Nevertheless, Ginsburg’s presentation of the Taiwanese case has been 
subjected to sound criticisms that the empirical evidences do not support his argument that Taiwan’s 
judicial independence has anything to do with power diffusion among its political parties. This paper 
attempts to present an alternative ‘credible commitment theory’ that addresses this outlier case, and finds 
empirical support for the theory. 
                                                          
1 Tom Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 2003). 
2 Percy R. Luney, Jr., “The Judiciary: Its Organization and Status in the Parliamentary System,” Law and Contemporary 
Problems 53, no. 1(1990):135-62; Mark J. Ramseyer and Eric B. Rasmusen, Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political 
Economy of Judging in Japan (Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2003). 
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I. Literature Review 
I.a. The Developmental State 
This section mainly covers the literature on judicial independence, although a brief mentioning of 
the developmental state literature first would be helpful. The definitive works in this area3 describe the 
developmental state as an autonomous state that, for reasons such as ‘systemic vulnerability’,4 is 
incentivized to promote economic development. Typically, it spearheads an export-oriented economic 
developmental program for the country, characterized by anti-neoliberal industrial policies, by forming a 
close partnership with domestic business groups, buying time for strategic industries to incubate 
internationally competitive firms. The state is instrumental in offering subsidies, policy loans, political 
suppression of labor, protection from international competition, stabilizing the macroeconomic 
environment, and various forms of assistance. According to Peter Evans’ seminal study, there are only 
three archetype developmental states that truly meet the demands – Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. 
During their respective developmental stages, each of these countries was governed by a state that had 
enough capacity to effectively administer and communicate its policies, as well as the needed autonomy 
to act independently from their corporate partners. The S. Korea state, in particular, enforced a strict and 
internally competitive environment, one often harsher than what normal market pressure may impose, in 
order to continually upgrade corporate performance. For example, in the ‘60s it was not uncommon for 
those Korean chaebols surviving the market but failing to meet performance targets to be dismantled by 
the state and having their assets claimed by other better-performing chaebols.  
                                                          
3 Chalmer Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925-1975 (Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, 1982). Alice H. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industrialization (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989). Peter B. Evans, Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transformation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1995). Robert Wade, Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian 
Industrialization (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990). 
4 Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater, "Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: 
Northeast and Southeast Asia in Comparative Perspective," International Organization 59, no. 2 (2005): 327-61. 
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One key implication of the developmental state literature that is relevant to the present study is 
that business-government relationship may sour when the developmental state matures.5 A successful 
developmental state eventually breeds a corporate sector that is increasingly powerful economically, less 
dependent upon protections from international competition, and can solicit funding conveniently from 
international capital markets. The corporate sector may have both the incentive and the clout to fight for 
freeing itself from the discipline imposed by the state, to bargain for a bigger piece of the pie in their 
numerous profitable joint projects, or even to capture the state regarding policies and regulations. For 
example, merger and acquisition activities in S. Korea in the early ‘80s frequently ignored the Fair Trade 
and Anti-Monopoly Act enacted in 1981 that was designed to contain the power of the chaebols.6 In 
Taiwan from the late ‘80s onwards, businessmen-turned-lawmakers at both the national and the provincial 
levels received enormous profits from obtaining ‘sweetheart’ contracts in numerous large-scale public 
construction projects.’7 
I.b.i. Theories of Judicial Independence 
Following the framework delineated by Vanberg8, the literature on theories explaining judicial 
independence in democratic contexts can be categorized into endogenous incentive models and 
exogenous costs models. The first category assumes that power-holders can undermine judicial 
independence without incurring much cost, but choose not to do so because they, on balance, receive 
direct or indirect benefits by allowing the judiciary to remain independent. The direct benefits include 
information benefits, shifting blame (to the court), or help maintaining the separations of powers. The 
indirect benefit models are exemplified by the ‘insurance theory’9, which assumes risk-averse political 
                                                          
5 Eun Mee Kim, Big Business, Strong State: Collusion and Conflict in South Korean Development, 1960-1990 (Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1997). 
6 Kim, Big Business, Strong State, 195. 
7 Ming-Chang Tsai, "Dependency, the State and Class in the Neoliberal Transition of Taiwan," Third World Quarterly 22, no. 3: 
370. 
8 Georg Vanberg, "Constitutional Courts in Comparative Perspective: A Theoretical Assessment," (Forthcoming). 
9 Mark J. Ramseyer, "The Puzzling (In)Dependence of Courts: A Comparative Approach," The Journal of Legal Studies 23, no. 2 
(1994): 721-47. Matthew C. Stephenson, "'When the Devil Turns ... ': The Political Foundations of Independent Judicial 
Review," Journal of Legal Studies 32, no. 1 (Jan 2003): 59-89. Ginsburg, Judicial Review. 
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parties seeking political hedges. The theory asserts that, when there is long-term expected power diffusion 
among major political parties (meaning that they are expected to alternate in office), it can be beneficial, 
under certain conditions, for all parties to cooperate in mutual concessions in terms of their policy 
positions. In other words, a party agreeing not to over abuse its power against its opponents when it is in 
office, given that its opponents agree to do the same, would be a win-win deal given that each has a 
considerable chance of losing office from time to time. But since the boundary values of such 
arrangement are often unclear, an independent arbiter, i.e. the Court, is needed to enforce this equilibrium 
by calling the boundaries. 
It should be explained that the ‘on balance’ benefits mentioned above means that the maintenance 
of judiciary independence is an all-or-nothing ‘package deal’, which is largely assumed by the literature. 
The power-holders cannot surgically resist only those judicial decisions they dislike while allowing 
independence to prevail in other judicial decisions. They can either grant full judicial independence or not 
at all, and they find the former ‘on balance’ more appealing. To be specific, however, the exact scope to 
which the ‘package deal’ assumption applies may cover just a certain type of court, e.g. the constitutional 
court, the administrative court, or the ordinary courts, etc., instead of the entire judiciary. In any case, the 
point of the literature is that case-by-case intervention would be difficult. 
The insurance theory is frequently the starting point in models addressing judicial independence 
in newly democratized countries, but these models also adjust the theory to fit the new context. For 
example, Popova subscribes to the central role of power diffusion but argues that the insurance theory 
neglects the immediate benefits of enforcing a subservient judiciary in newly democratized countries 
where typically higher benefits and lower costs associated with attempting to control the court prevail.10 
In particular, a subservient judiciary can help the incumbent government proactively maximize its chance 
of re-election, by imprisoning or disqualifying the rival candidates, or declaring their financing activities 
                                                          
10 Maria Popova, "Political Competition as an Obstacle to Judicial Independence: Evidence from Russia and Ukraine," 
Comparative Political Studies 43, no. 10 (2010): 1202-29. 
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illegal. Aydin presents a similar argument, albeit identifying slightly different cost and benefit factors.11 
They back up their claim with case examples addressing Pakistan and Russia in the 2000s as well as 
Ukraine in the late 1990s. Unlike the insurance theory, these models assume myopic leaders and deny an 
exogenous chance of electoral success based on power diffusion alone; and it is precisely when the parties 
are equally competitive that a subservient judiciary, by tipping the balance, becomes the most effective. 
This conclusion is at odds with the insurance theory proponents, who see intensive political competition 
as a catalyst to judicial independence. In fact, in a separate subsection titled ‘Insurance in New 
Democracies’, Ginsburg suggests that ‘other things being equal, [greater] uncertainty [in new 
democracies] increases demand for the political insurance that judicial review provides.’12 More recently, 
Epperly13 argues that the more undemocratic a regime, the higher the cost associated with losing office; 
thus, provided that there is electoral competition, it would be of greater salience and therefore there would 
be a greater incentive to insure. 
The key idea of the insurance theory can be generalized into the following: when the incumbent 
political leadership is faced with a powerful opponent who may threaten to exert influence over the 
judiciary when assuming political power, then it may find it preferable to allow judicial independence. 
The essential element here is power diffusion, not insurance. The act of insurance is, as demonstrated by 
Popova and Aydin, only one of the possible outcomes in response to power diffusion, under certain 
assumptions such as the absence of myopia. Another one of such assumptions that both sides of the 
debate adopt is that the powerful opponent must be a rival political party, which actually should not be 
taken for granted. Here is where the developmental state literature may prove relevant – a power diffusion 
between the state and the private corporate sector does not engender an expectation of alternation in office, 
and thus leaves no demand for rational hedging (insurance); yet the powerful private corporate sector may 
                                                          
11 Aylin Aydın, "Judicial Independence across Democratic Regimes: Understanding the Varying Impact of Political 
Competition," Law & Society Review 47, no. 1 (2013): 105-34. 
12 Ginsburg, Judicial Review, 30. 
13 Brad Epperly, "Political Competition and Judicial Independence in Democracies and Non-Democracies," Article under review. 
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exert influence over the judiciary to its own advantage vis-à-vis the state via its close connections with the 
state. In this situation, the state may find it beneficial to grant independence to the judiciary. 
The second category, i.e. exogenous cost models, asserts that judicial independence is possible 
because attacking the judiciary is costly to the power-holders, regardless of whether they see an 
independent judiciary as beneficial or not. In this paper, this is referred to as unconditional independence, 
as opposed to conditional independence achieved in the endogenous incentive models. The source of this 
costliness is most commonly the public support for the judiciary (although foreign sources can also be a 
possibility), which can be explained either as a result of the court proving to be more aligned with the 
people’s interests than the power-holders in an imperfect system of democratic representation,14 or as a 
need for a coordinator of spontaneous citizen understandings and actions against otherwise ambiguous 
constitutional infringements.15 This latter argument presents the court decision as a focal point around 
which the public establishes the consensus that counter-action towards the power holders is clearly 
needed; and since the public treasures this function of the judiciary, it will protect its independence that is 
necessary in ensuring its proper functioning. However, both arguments require the judiciary to have a 
good public reputation that normally takes time and effort to accumulate (and this is especially true in 
newly democratized countries). As such, most exogenous costs models take into account the strategic 
interactions between the court and other players in order to meet this requirement. For example, Epstein, 
Knight, & Shvetsova16 posit that constitutional courts strategically make decisions that rationally remain 
within the tolerance intervals of various power-holders. The relevance of this behavioral pattern to the 
emergence of judicial independence is that doing so skillfully would, in the longer term, expand these 
intervals, thus allowing the constitutional court a greater autonomy. The ‘building up [of] a reservoir of 
goodwill among political actors and the public alike’ is a function of repeatedly remaining within the 
                                                          
14 Matthew C. Stephenson, "Court of Public Opinion: Government Accountability and Judicial Independence," Journal of Law, 
Economics, & Organization 20, no. 2 (2004): 379-99. 
15 Georg Vanberg, "Substance Vs. Procedure: Constitutional Enforcement and Constitutional Choice," Journal of Economic 
Behavior & Organization 80, no. 2 (2011): 309-18. 
16 Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, and Olga Shvetsova, "The Role of Constitutional Courts in the Establishment and Maintenance of 
Democratic Systems of Government," Law & Society Review 35, no. 1 (2001): 152. 
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tolerance level itself as well as accepting ‘safe’ cases only, e.g. civil rights cases instead of those related 
to separation of powers matters.17 
The theoretical significance of endogenous cost models, and the proactive role of the judiciary in 
general, can hardly be underrated in the literature. However, the exact way the judiciary, and in particular 
the constitutional court, may build up its reputation is far from clear. Although the principle of having the 
constitutional court making decisions that offend neither the public nor the power-holders is likely 
indisputable, the practice of handling ‘safe’ cases only, i.e. civil rights cases, as suggested by Epstein, 
Knight, & Shvetsova, does not seem to effectively work towards this goal at least within our present 
context. Many civil rights such as self-defense, privacy right, freedom of speech and association, etc., are 
politically sensitive, involving the limitation of the power of the police and other government departments. 
If the constitutional court decides to act within the tolerance level of the power holders in these cases, it 
may further harm its own reputation and thus receives even less public support. 
Aside from reputation, the role of public relations in organizing public support is emphasized by 
both Vanberg18 and Staton.19 If the power holders are wary of the potential of a public backlash, then the 
expectation of sufficient media coverage of the constitutional court’s decisions would induce the court to 
act more independently. Moreover, Staton also pays attention to the possibility that the court itself is 
equipped with the resources to economically promote its own case decisions, which is particularly 
relevant when the public’s accurate understanding of its jurisprudential rationale is crucial to generating 
the needed public support. Under this theoretical framework, media coverage is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition for unconditional judicial independence.  
Finally, the role of internal politics is being increasingly recognized. The case of the Russian 
constitutional court elaborated in Epstein, Knight, & Shvetsova, detailing the internal conflicts among the 
                                                          
17 Epstein, Knight, and Shvetsova, “Role of Constitutional Courts”, 152. 
18 Georg Vanberg, "Legislative-Judicial Relations: A Game-Theoretic Approach to Constitutional Review," American Journal of 
Political Science 45, no. 2 (2001): 346-61. 
19 Jeffrey K. Staton, "Constitutional Review and the Selective Promotion of Case Results," American Journal of Political Science 
50, no. 1 (2006): 98-112. 
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justices within the Court, highlights the importance of the internal politics within a judiciary that often 
cannot be assumed a unitary actor. In addition, Lax20 demonstrates examples of studying court legal 
policy determination that address the collegiality and hierarchy within the judicial system. Although these 
are inspiring works that contribute to the development of a relatively new area in judicial politics research, 
not much has been done that directly connects the internal politics of the judiciary to explaining its 
independence. 
I.b.ii. The Role of Formal Institutional Rules 
One particularly important and controversial issue found within the literature concerns the role of 
micro-level formal institutional rules that supposedly enforce judicial independence, e.g. rules that 
specifies the appointment procedures of judges, the length of their terms and whether renewal is an option, 
etc. It is noteworthy that within all the theories that have been covered by the previous subsection, these 
formal rules play a minimal role. They are not at all the focus of those theoretical frameworks, in the 
sense that the scholars are not trying to look into what political interactions would give rise to the needed 
formal rules that in turn ensure judicial independence. For example, the insurance theory implicitly asserts 
that as long as there is power diffusion among political parties, and that agents are risk-averse and not 
myopic, then with certain utility functions assumed there would be judicial independence regardless of 
whether the appropriate formal rules are in place. 
Nonetheless, earlier accounts of the debate see some keen attention paid to emphasizing the 
contributive role of formal rules. In his introductory chapter of ‘Judicial Independence in the Age of 
Democracy’, Russell asserts that ‘the focus of any practical endeavors to secure judicial independence 
must be on institutional arrangements designed to protect independence’, and that ‘it is only through 
consideration of the full range of pressures and forces impinging on judges… that a comprehensive theory 
                                                          
20 Jeffrey R. Lax, "Political Constraints on Legal Doctrine: How Hierarchy Shapes the Law," The Journal of Politics 74 (2012): 
765-81. 
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of judicial independence can be built.’21 Regarding the ‘full range of pressures and forces’ Russell is not 
referring to anything in the likes of public backlash, but instead a full range of institutional rules related to 
appointment, removal, remuneration, case administration, personnel, etc. plus the possibilities of physical 
threats and bribery.22 
Yet, during the past decade or so, it seems that the academic community have gradually reached 
the consensus that the study of judicial independence is not about the study of formal rules. This is 
brought about by the accumulation of empirical studies that do not support a positive correlation between 
de jure judicial independence (as defined by formal rules) and de facto judicial independence. For 
example, in his paper on judicial reform and independence in Brazil and Argentina, Brinks writes that 
‘most scholars acknowledge that formal institutional arrangements (secure tenure, salary protection, etc.) 
correlate poorly (indeed, often negatively) with actual independent behavior on the part of the courts’.23 
He highlights Shaw’s analysis of Latin American countries in which Uruguay and Costa Rica is placed 
‘dead last’ in terms of formal rules; but this ranking, if used as a predictor of de facto judicial 
independence, would ‘surprise most scholars of the region’.24 Even more relevant to this present study is 
the quantitative testing performed by Garoupa, Grembi, & Lin on the Taiwanese judiciary. Despite the 
fact that the formal rules for the appointment process of Taiwan’s grand justices accorded disproportional 
influence to the ruling parties during 1988-2008, they don’t find it a significant factor in explaining the 
grand justices’ decision making.25 As such, scholarly attention diverted away from formal rules towards 
the underlying political dynamics between the judiciary and the power holders. Hilbink writes 
conclusively that ‘although there may be practical advantages to limiting scholarly inquiry to the formal 
                                                          
21 Peter H Russell, "Toward A General Theory of Judicial Independence, " in Judicial Independence in the Age of Democracy: 
Critical Perspectives from around the World, ed. Peter H Russell and David M. O'Brien (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 2001), 8. 
22 Russell, "Toward A General Theory", 13-21. 
23 Daniel Brinks, "Judicial Reform and Independence in Brazil and Argentina: The Beginning of a New Millennium?" Texas 
International Law Journal 40, no. 3 (2005): 597. 
24 Brinks, "Judicial Reform and Independence", 597. 
25 Nuno Garoupa, Veronica Grembi, and Shirley Ching-ping Lin, "Explaining Constitutional Review in New Democracies: The 
Case of Taiwan," Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal 20, no. 1 (2011): 5, 24. 
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type of judicial independence [(referring to the formal rules)], ultimately it is positive independence that 
many scholars seek to explain.’26 Stephenson also writes that ‘formal protections are not sufficient to 
evaluate the true independence of the judiciary.’27 Even more to the point, Brinks concludes that ‘unless 
the goal is explaining institutional design per se… the concept of formal independence is singularly 
unhelpful.’28 
However, in a very recent paper, Melton and Ginsburg argue that although it is true that even the 
most well-designed formal institutional rules do not automatically translate into de facto judicial 
independence, they do matter. Regarding this, Melton and Ginsburg offer two highlights. First, they adopt 
the focal point argument in the exogenous cost literature pioneered by Weingast29 and apply it in the 
context of formal rules. It is aforementioned that the public has the incentive to protect judicial 
independence due to the judiciary’s role in facilitating collective actions against constitutional 
infringements by offering a focal point through its rulings. However, whether the power holders are 
indeed obstructing judicial independence can itself be an ambiguous issue, creating a secondary collective 
action problem. This is where formal rules come into play. Specifically, when a formal rule protecting de 
jure judicial independence is introduced into the constitution, in case it is breached it provides a focal 
point that contributes to organizing a collective action that protects the judiciary.30 This theory assumes 
that the formal rules are sufficiently clear and specific31 so that any breach is self-evident, without calling 
for another court ruling (so a formal rule that merely states that the judiciary should be independent would 
not be good enough). The second highlight that Melton and Ginsburg make is their emphasis on 
                                                          
26 Lisa Hilbink, "The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence," World Politics 64, no. 4 (2012): 588. 
27 Matthew C. Stephenson, “Judicial Independence: What It Is, How It Can Be Measured, Why It Occurs,” Harvard University, 
n.d., 2. 
28 Brinks, "Judicial Reform and Independence", 597. 
29 Barry R. Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law," The American Political Science Review 91, 
no. 2 (1997): 245-63. 
30 James Melton and Tom Ginsburg, "Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?: A Reevaluation of Explanations for 
Judicial Independence," Journal of Law and Courts 2, no. 2 (2014): 192. 
31 Melton and Ginsburg. "De Jure Judicial Independence", 193. 
11 
introducing formal rules conjunctively. In order to make these rules effective, it is important that several 
of them coexist so that the various means of attacking the court are well covered, as ‘those who wish to 
interfere with courts need only find one hole in the judicial armor’.32 Although Melton and Ginsburg, 
based on their statistical analysis, particularly favors the combination of formal rules pertaining to the 
appointment as well as removal of the justices, what constitutes a good combination may vary from 
country to country depending on their larger institutional environments.  
  
                                                          
32 Melton and Ginsburg, "De Jure Judicial Independence", 194. 
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II. A Credible Commitment Theory of Judicial Independence 
This section develops a theory of judicial independence that attempts to achieve three objectives. 
First, it aims at incorporating the concepts of power diffusion (present in many endogenous incentive 
models) and public support (present in the exogenous cost models) into a single causal mechanism. 
Second, it interprets the concept of power diffusion flexibly such that it does not necessarily entails 
competitiveness among political parties. Specifically, it addresses a situation in which despite single 
(political) party dominance, power diffusion is achieved due to the presence of a powerful private 
corporate sector (the ‘corporate’ hereon), as exemplified by the Taiwanese developmental state at its 
mature stage. Third, the theory aims at demonstrating how granting unconditional judicial independence 
can actually be difficult for the dominant party, and proceeds to explain how the difficulty can be 
overcome by credible commitment strategies. The theory identifies the independence of the constitutional 
court as the ultimate dependent variable, but involves the independence of the ordinary court judges as an 
intermediate one. 
The theory acknowledges the insurance theory as an adequate explanation of judicial 
independence when there is power diffusion among political parties. Among the East Asian 
developmental states, S. Korea experienced such power diffusion immediately after democratization 
while Japanese politics had been dominated by a single party for over forty years since its 
democratization after WWII.  Their respective high and low degrees of constitutional court independence 
are therefore consistent with the prediction of the insurance theory. However, Taiwan also experienced 
single party dominance, yet its constitutional court made some remarkable progress in terms of its 
independence from the dominant party. This calls for an alternative theory that can better explain the 
outcome observed in Taiwan, namely how judicial independence may nonetheless emerge under single 
party dominance. 
13 
A few conceptual clarifications need to be made. First, in this paper, Fiss’ characterization of 
judicial independence is adopted, including three dimensions: party detachment, individual autonomy, 
and political insularity of the judges.33 In the political context of single party dominance, this 
characterization mainly refers to a court independent from the dominant party. Second, the state is 
basically controlled by the dominant party (‘state’ or ‘party-state’ hereon). A powerful corporate sector 
can join the dominant party as members but it is not assumed to be part of the party leadership, so it does 
not directly control the party. The corporate leaders can also join the ranks of the legislators, and on a bill-
by-bill basis it may be able to form ad hoc alliances and have the legislature pass the bills it favors. The 
corporate does not join the executive and does not directly influence the judiciary, but through the 
developmental partnership it can exert indirect influences: threatening to play non-cooperative in the joint 
projects, so as to force members of the dominant party or the party-state to pressure the court to act in 
accordance with its preferences. The dominant party and the corporate are the only powerful players in 
the political arena, which is almost always the case in a developmental state. 
The theory holds the following assumptions. Their necessity would be apparent later in this 
section when the model is further elaborated. 
 A1: The judiciary is headed by the judiciary leadership, a person who exercises strong control over all 
regulations internal to the judiciary. 
 A2: The formal rules governing the operation of the judiciary, i.e. those pertaining to the appointment, 
tenure, and removal of the constitutional court justices and those pertaining to case administration and 
personnel issues (following Russell’s categorization) that apply to ordinary court judges, can exist in 
the form of legislations, constitutional provisions, and regulations internal to the judiciary. The 
judiciary leadership exercises strong internal control regarding the regulations internal to the judiciary. 
                                                          
33 Owen M. Fiss, "The Limits of Judicial Independence," The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review 25, no. 1 (1993): 
60-67. The ‘party’ in ‘party detachment’ refers to the parties involved in each court case, not political parties. 
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 A3: In newly democratized countries, the judiciary, which has typically acted as an instrument of the 
previous authoritarian regime (a la Popova and Aydin), is endowed with poor reputation in the 
beginning. 
 A4: The constitutional court is unable to build public support by making decisions within the dominant 
party leadership’s tolerance intervals, or selectively accepting ‘safe’ cases only. In newly 
democratized countries (and especially when the incumbent dominant party continues to be in office) 
the office-holders are far from perfect representatives of the people, therefore acting within their 
tolerance intervals may avoid attacks but would not contribute to judicial reputation. 
 A5: The public does not distinguish between the constitutional court and the ordinary courts (or any 
other component members of the court system) when it comes to its support for the judiciary. To the 
public, it is just ‘the court’ in general. 
 A6: There exists a group of reformist judges at the lower echelon of the judicial system (typically at 
the district courts), whose history traces back to the authoritarian regime before democratization. 
These people seek integrity, impartiality, and independence, and are typically suppressed by the 
regime (and therefore remain at the lower echelon), but regain their activism after democratization. 
There exists another group of conservative judges at the higher echelon of the system (typically at the 
higher courts or the higher levels of the district courts), who have close ties with the dominant party 
leadership (‘party leadership’ hereon). 
 A7: The party leadership is much more concerned with court cases involving the corporate than other 
cases handled by the ordinary courts, because there is no other interest group (opposition party, labor 
union, etc.) powerful enough, or expected to be powerful enough, to challenge the dominant party. The 
party leadership is also concerned with constitutional court cases, in which its policies made via the 
executive or the legislative branch can potentially be struck down. 
As aforementioned, a developmental state at its mature stage may encounter a great challenge 
since its potent elite corporate partners gain bargaining power against the state and seek to expand their 
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political influence. The powerful corporate and the dominant party thus form a kind of power diffusion: 
the latter remains the senior partner of the two, but can no longer so freely ‘arm twist’ the former as it 
used to. However, the effect of this power diffusion cannot be captured by the logic of either the 
insurance theory or the ‘separation-of-powers’ thesis,34 because the dominant party and the corporate 
neither are expected to alternate in office or power, nor seek to operate independently. The party-state’s 
success on one hand depends upon a tight cooperation with the corporate, but on the other hand hinges on 
its own autonomy from excessive external influence. When the corporate grows powerful, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to impose this discipline without jeopardizing the cooperation.35  
The credible commitment theory perceives this challenge as the context in which the dominant 
party leadership makes its decision regarding judicial independence. The party leadership may find it 
beneficial to allow judicial independence for two reasons. First, an independent court can discipline the 
corporate in accordance with the law and thus contributes to restraining its growing power, while a court 
subservient to the dominant party would fail to do so since the party-state itself is subject to the influence 
of the powerful corporate through their cooperative economic relationship. Second, an independent court 
allows the party-state to freely express a position supportive of the corporate which is important to 
maintaining their cooperative relationship, knowing that this has no effect upon the court’s decision. On 
the other hand, from time to time an independent court’s ruling may contradict the party leadership’s 
preferred outcome, and as such there is a tradeoff. The relevant court at issue here refers to the ordinary 
courts of the judiciary system, which typically handle cases related to the corporate. 
However, it should be noted that if it is at all desirable for the party leadership to grant judicial 
independence, this independence must be unconditional. In the generic scenario associated with 
conditional judicial independence in which the party leadership finds it beneficial to allow the judiciary to 
act independently, all it has to do is not to attack the court, but is otherwise not obliged to commit to any 
                                                          
34 Vanberg, “Constitutional Courts”, 9. 
35 This will be less of an issue if the dominant party or the state owns most of the corporate. However, this was not the case in S. 
Korea and Japan, and it had been the case in Taiwan only up to the early ‘80s when the private Taiwanese corporate were still not 
very powerful. This point will be further elaborated in the next section of the paper. 
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specific actions or policies. However, in the case of the maturing developmental state, the resultant 
conditional judicial independence would not be sustainable since the powerful corporate would find ways 
to pressure the party leadership to reverse its decision. Therefore, although endogenous benefits explain 
the party leadership’s initial motivation (if one exists) to allow judicial independence, it must then turn 
the resultant independence into an unconditional one if it is to be sustainable, i.e. to make it a credible 
commitment so that it becomes very costly to reverse the policy and therefore the corporate finds it not 
worthwhile to apply pressure. In summary, the party leadership faces two issues regarding its decision on 
judicial independence: whether it is desirable and whether it is feasible. The first is attended to below, 
while the second would be addressed in the next subsection. 
II.a. Judicial Independence -- Desirability 
Table 1 displays the expected payoffs of the party leadership regarding its decision on 
unconditional judicial independence under four possible scenarios. At times, the dominant party 
leadership desires to reward or punish the corporate via the court as a means to discipline it. The court’s 
(true) preferences regarding the cases when they arise can differ from the dominant party leadership’s, but 
this is relevant only if there is unconditional judicial independence. Together they form the four mutually 
exclusive and collectively exhaustive scenarios.  
The dominant party leadership encounters two types of expected payoffs in accordance with the 
previous discussion.36 The first type is the relative payoff associated with having the court’s final decision 
matching the party leadership’s preference (V). If unconditional judicial independence is granted, then 
this matching is just coincidental (scenarios 1 and 4). If it is not granted, then this payoff is assured only 
when the dominant party leadership wants to reward the corporate anyway, i.e. scenarios 3 and 4. Even 
though the party-controlled court always issues decisions matching the dominant party leadership’s 
preference, yet when the decision speaks against the corporate, the corporate would retaliate through 
various means of non-cooperation such that the party leadership may back off. This is the case in 
                                                          
36 All payoffs are relative expected payoffs appropriately discounted for the future, and assume positive values.  
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scenarios 1 and 2, in which there is only a certain probability of success attached to this negative decision 
(q; q<1), and therefore the payoff component equals qV in these two scenarios. On the other hand, when 
there is unconditional judicial independence any retaliation is deemed ineffective in nullifying the 
decision, because it would be too costly for the party leadership to yield to the retaliation and reverse the 
judicial independence. Therefore the value of this payoff component in scenario 1 under conditional 
judicial independence is V instead of qV. The second type is the relative payoff derived from position-
taking (P). With unconditional judicial independence, the party leadership can always express support for 
the corporate, knowing that this support has no effect on the judicial outcome. This supportive official 
stance is contributive to maintaining the cooperative relationship between the party-state and the 
corporate in pursuit of their developmental projects. In the absence of judicial independence, however, 
this relative payoff component is assuredly present only when the dominant party leadership wants to 
reward the corporate anyway (scenarios 3 and 4). When it doesn’t (scenarios 1 and 2), the party 
leadership will rule against the corporate via the court if qV>P, or will give up doing so and instead opts 
for expressing support if qV<P, resulting in a payoff of max(qV,P) for both scenarios. The dominant party 
leadership cannot capture both qV and P because its judicial action against the corporate would 
immediately discredit its supposedly supportive position. Finally, in scenario 3 under unconditional 
judicial independence, even though the court rules against the corporate, practically speaking the party 
leadership should be able to quite conveniently compensate the corporate through other means, even 
though such compensation may not be a perfect substitute for a favorable ruling. Therefore, an additional 
payoff component rV is introduced, where r<1 but not much smaller. The same logic does not apply to 
scenario 2, however. Under unconditional judicial independence, if the court rules in favor of the 
corporate, it is not reasonable to assume that the dominant party leadership can conveniently punish the 
corporate through other means, both because of the relative shortage of such means and because doing so 
would again render the position-taking non-credible. 
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The decision of the party leadership is such that it will favor unconditional judicial independence 
if the overall expected payoff under this arrangement is greater than that without it, taking into account 
some probability distribution over the four scenarios. When the corporate grows in power, q decreases 
because it is more likely that the corporate can have its way, P increases because it is increasingly 
important for the party leadership to express support if it wants to maintain the cooperative relationship, 
and the probability distribution biases towards scenarios 1 and 2 because the party leadership feels a 
greater urgency to discipline the corporate. In particular, among cases in which the corporate actually 
violates the law (scenarios 1 and 3), the party leadership desires less to protect the corporate, meaning that 
the probability of scenario 1 increases vis-à-vis scenario 3. Other variables are not affected. As a result, 
the dominant party leadership is always indifferent in scenario 4, and converges towards indifference in 
scenario 2 (with q decreasing and P increasing), rendering them insignificant in the overall decision. It 
always prefers unconditional judicial independence in scenario 1 and no judicial independence in scenario 
3. However, since the probability distribution biases towards scenario 1 and away from scenario 3 as the 
corporate becomes increasingly powerful, and moreover the incremental gain of unconditional 
independence in scenario 1 (which converges towards V) is much larger than its incremental loss in 
scenario 3, i.e. (1-r)V, the overall effect of a maturing developmental state is to promote unconditional 
judicial independence as the dominant party leadership’s desirable choice. 
  
Table 1: Expected Payoffs of Dominant Party's Decisions on Unconditional Judicial Independence
Scenario Dominant Party's Court's Independent Payoff under Unconditional Payoff under No
Preference Preference Judicial Independence Judicial Independence
1 Punish Corporate Punish Corporate V + P Max (qV , P)
2 Punish Corporate Reward Corporate P Max (qV , P)
3 Reward Corporate Punish Corporate P + rV V + P 
4 Reward Corporate Reward Corporate V + P V + P 
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II.b. Unconditional Judicial Independence – Feasibility 
When the dominant party leadership decides to grant unconditional independence to the 
judiciary’s ordinary courts, there inevitably arises a credible commitment problem that needs to be 
resolved. The theory here offers a three-part solution to the problem. 
The first part of the solution makes use of formal rules as a commitment device, based on the 
rationale first laid out by Weingast and applied by Melton and Ginsburg. In this case the party leadership 
would introduce a collection of clear and specific formal rules intended to conjunctively protect the 
independence of the ordinary court judges. Although the presence of these formal rules per se does not 
carry with it the authority to ensure compliance, they generate a focal point effect that contributes to the 
organization of public backlash whenever they are breached or reversed. However, this focal point effect 
against breach and reversal can be fruitful only if the judiciary enjoys good public reputation. If the 
judiciary hasn’t accumulated enough public reputation, then even if everyone is aware of the breach and 
everyone agree that it is a breach, the public backlash would fail to take place because people do not think 
that the judiciary adequately serves citizens’ interests in the first place. Based on A3 and A4, therefore, 
the first part of the solution by itself is insufficient. 
The second part of the solution attempts to modify upon the theory above. The idea is that formal 
rules matter in two ways, not just one – both the message (the rules) and the medium (their 
communications process) are important. The significance of communications has been emphasized by 
Vanberg and Staton, but here it takes on a different role. Instead of the court, it is the party leadership 
who invests in a promotional campaign surrounding the ratification of the formal rules so as to credibly 
commit to unconditional judicial independence. For example, they can be ratified after a prestigious 
international organization has been hired to look into the matter, with a high profile press conference held 
to introduce them to the public, during which high-ranking officials make speeches emphasizing their 
importance. If the rules are breached or reversed thereafter, this will bring about a public (electoral) 
backlash since the action signals inconsistency and untrustworthiness on the part of the power holders. In 
other words, the party leadership artificially makes it costly to renege on its promise of judicial 
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independence, thereby turning it unconditional. There are three noteworthy features here. First, it is the 
communications process of the formal rules, and not the formal rules alone, that generates a focal point 
effect that brings the public’s attention to the power holders’ inconsistent actions. Second, this focal point 
effect against inconsistency and untrustworthiness would contribute to organizing a public backlash 
regardless of the judiciary’s public reputation, since the public’s evaluation of the power holders’ quality 
as reflected by their actions is independent of its perception about the judiciary. Third, this focal point 
effect should be most pronounced in the short run, i.e. when the formal rules are breached or reversed not 
long after their ratification. As such, it works well in conjunction with the first part of the solution. In the 
short run, unconditional judicial independence is supported by the second focal point effect, enabling the 
ordinary courts to begin building their public reputation. In the longer run, when the reputation has 
sufficiently improved, the first focal point effect of the formal rules kicks in as well, further reinforcing 
the court’s unconditional independence. 
The third part of the solution involves the unique role of the judiciary leadership. In order to 
credibly commit, the party leadership can appoint what may be called a ‘dedicated and senior’ judicial 
leadership to carry out various policies that promote judicial independence. A ‘dedicated’ person is 
defined as someone having the self-interest to empower the judiciary via unconditional independence. 
This person regards the judiciary as her own power base, and aims at acquiring power by empowering the 
judiciary. She is likely to have a legal background, and plans to spend the rest of her political career 
within the judiciary. A ‘senior’ person is defined to be someone high-ranking and powerful within the 
dominant party. Once appointed, the senior judiciary leadership is assumed to enjoy considerable 
autonomy and thus not just a pawn of the party. Her appointment is more a negotiated outcome between 
her and the (rest of the) party leadership. The office is more earned than assigned, and is one of the 
positions prized by the top leaders of the dominant party. Due to her dedication, the judiciary leadership 
will pursue judicial independence via formal rules internal to the judiciary, mixing in the focal point 
effects of the first two parts of the solution. To be sure, means to achieve judicial independence other than 
formal rules can also be pursued under the protection of the judiciary leadership even though they lack the 
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additional benefit of the focal point effects, especially when formal rules are not an option. Essentially, 
the dedicated judiciary leadership acts on behalf of the party leadership, but it is at the same time in her 
own interest to do so. Importantly, due to her seniority, the judiciary leadership is autonomous enough to 
resist requests of reversing the judicial independence. In other words, it would be very costly for the 
dominant party leadership to effectively renege, because it is difficult to overcome the judiciary 
leadership’s power and it is very costly for the judiciary leadership to comply.  
The role of the dedicated and senior judiciary leadership as either a credible commitment strategy 
or a condition to the theory needs to be clarified, and so is the probabilistic relation between judiciary 
leadership and judicial independence. The following three scenarios all assume single party dominance. 
In the first scenario, the party leadership does not consider corporate power as a threat and does not 
support judicial independence, while the judiciary leadership is senior and dedicated. In this case 
theoretically the judiciary leadership can still pursue judicial independence alone because she has the 
power to do so, but doing so against the party leadership’s will can be costly,37 and so the probability of 
this happening is positive but small. In the second scenario, the party leadership considers corporate 
power a threat and wants to grant judicial independence, while judiciary leadership is senior and 
dedicated. In this case judiciary leadership’s pursuit of judicial independence is assured. In both cases the 
dedicated and senior judiciary leadership is a condition to the theory and it has already been fulfilled. In 
the third scenario, the party leadership wants to grant judicial independence but the judiciary leadership is 
either not dedicated or not senior, or both. In this case the condition to the theory is instead an opening 
through which the judiciary leadership can be replaced, e.g. retirement or voluntary resignation, upon 
which the party leadership may appoint a dedicated and senior judiciary leadership in order to credibly 
commit. Before this opportunity emerges, this judiciary leadership may still idiosyncratically welcome 
and pursue judicial independence; but since the major attraction or feasibility of unconditional judicial 
independence loses its relevance under this scenario, it is again not very likely to happen. 
                                                          
37 Note that this is different from the scenario under which the party leadership reneges, because here the judiciary leadership has 
not yet made any credible commitments, and therefore complying to the party leadership’s will is less costly. 
22 
II.c. Judicial Independence – Endgame 
The context of the newly democratized country offers both an opportunity and a challenge to the 
judiciary leadership regarding the constitutional court. When a country democratizes, public support 
begins to matter as potentially a major cost to anyone trying to attack the constitutional court, because the 
collective action problem associated with coordinating an effective public backlash diminishes when 
people can conveniently vote and elections are meaningful.38 Therefore the dedicated judiciary leadership 
has an incentive to achieve unconditional judicial independence through gradually accumulating public 
support. However, the initial condition of the judiciary she is endowed with enjoys no public support at 
all in accordance with A3, without which the constitutional court must play within the tolerance intervals 
of the party leadership in order to avoid attacks. But according to A4, this continual obedience does not in 
turn accumulate public reputation, leading to a stable and undesirable equilibrium in which the judiciary 
leadership finds it difficult to make any progress. 
The desire of the dominant party leadership to grant unconditional independence to the ordinary 
courts offers a breakthrough to this dilemma. When the credible commitment problem is resolved by the 
aforementioned three-part solution, the ordinary courts’ reformist judges as depicted by A6 would be free 
to act impartially and with integrity upon cases, especially those involving corporate corruptions and 
unfair practices. These cases, close to the public and attracting considerable media attention, would 
gradually earn reputation and accumulate pubic support for the court. This result is in the interest of the 
dedicated judiciary leadership, and it is therefore costly for the judiciary leadership to fulfill any request 
of reversing the judicial independence granted to the ordinary court judges. Moreover, in accordance with 
A5, such pubic support would then spill over to the constitutional court and therefore in the longer term, 
the constitutional court too can achieve unconditional judicial independence. Once the constitutional court 
can act outside of the party leadership’s tolerance intervals, demonstrating impartiality and integrity, 
without being attacked by the dominant party, this act itself would earn further public support, leading to 
                                                          
38 Vanberg, “Constitutional Courts”, 20-21. 
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a self-reinforcing equilibrium, which is again in the interest of the judicial leadership. This completes the 
mechanism that explains how the constitutional court gains unconditional independence under single-
party dominance in a newly democratized developmental state. 
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III. The Case of Taiwan: Empirical Evidence 
In a nutshell, the credible commitment theory presented in the previous section posits that if three 
conditions are fulfilled in the developmental state, i.e. single party dominance, power diffusion between 
the state and the corporate, and an opportunity to appoint a dedicated and senior judiciary leadership, then 
ordinary court unconditional independence would first be granted, followed by an improvement in the 
judiciary’s public reputation, and finally the unconditional independence of the constitutional court would 
be achieved. This section of the paper seeks to empirically verify the theory for the case of Taiwan. The 
first subsection investigates whether the three conditions were indeed fulfilled in Taiwan and the timing 
of these fulfillments. The following subsections then investigate the three milestones of the causal 
mechanism implied by the theory, each as a hypothesis to be tested. Again, the timing of these events, 
namely the second must take place after the first and the third must take place either immediately or 
shortly after the second, is crucial in offering support for the theory. 
III.a.i. Single Party Dominance 
Taiwan’s fulfillment of the ‘single party dominance’ condition as a newly democratized country 
is not apparent at the outset. Although it is difficult to pinpoint when democratization first took place in 
Taiwan, the formation of the opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 (which was against 
the law but was tolerated by the regime) arguably marked the beginning of a new era. In 2000, DPP 
candidate Chen Shui-bian won the presidential election. It is therefore convenient to assume that DPP 
gradually ascended to power during this fourteen-year period, and as such it would be dubious at best to 
describe the incumbent party Kuomintang (KMT) as ‘dominant’ during the 1990s.  
However, this was not the case. Tsai, in his paper tracing the roots of Taiwan’s neoliberal 
economic policy, comments that ‘until 2000 Taiwan was dominated by an authoritarian party, the 
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KMT.’39 When responding to the insurance theory, Chang also expresses that ‘the reasons that the 
Council of Grand Justices [i.e. the Constitutional Court] was invested with strong powers during the early 
years of democratization were in no way due to competitive power politics or political diffusion. During 
those years, the KMT was strong and it remained its great strength…’40  
These comments are not without empirical support. Table 2 presents the results of the most 
important elections in Taiwan between 1989 and 2001 in terms of party performance, which include the 
presidential elections, the legislative elections, and the National Assembly elections.41 The percentage 
votes each presidential candidate received and the percentage seats each party was able to secure are 
reasonably good indicators of each party’s respective relative political power.  
 
 
The objective here is to determine at which point in time power diffusion could be reasonably 
expected in Taiwan. Note that it is the expectation of sustained power diffusion and not power diffusion 
per se (especially if it is temporary) that is most relevant to both the insurance theory and the present 
                                                          
39 Tsai, "Dependency", 363. 
40 Tom Ginsburg et al., "Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in Asian Cases," National Taiwan 
University Law Review 3, no. 2 (2008): 169. 
41 In Taiwan, the National Assembly was the original legislature of the Republic of China (ROC) founded in 1912. Until 1992, its 
members were those elected in 1948 before the ROC was forced to move to Taiwan, and re-election was not supposed to take 
place until KMT reclaims the mainland. In the 1990s however, Taiwan underwent a series of Constitutional amendments to 
gradually shift the responsibilities of the National Assembly to the Legislative Yuan (Taiwan’s new legislature which existed 
before the 1990s but only assumed limited responsibilities), while in the meantime the two entities co-existed and each held their 
own elections. The National Assembly became effectively defunct by 2000 and was formally dissolved in 2005.  
Table 2: Party Performances in Major Elections in Taiwan, 1989-2001
KMT DPP CNP PFP
Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats %
1989 Legislative Yuan 91 72.3 21 16.1
1991 National Assembly 254 78.2 66 20.3
1992 Legislative Yuan 95 59.0 51 31.7
1995 Legislative Yuan 85 51.8 54 32.9 21 12.8
1996 National Assembly 183 54.8 99 29.6 46 13.8
1996 Presidential Lee & Lien (%) Pang & Hsieh (%)
54.0 21.1
1998 Legislative Yuan 123 54.7 70 31.1 11 4.9
2000 Presidential Lien & Siew Chen & Lu (%) Soong & Chang (%)
23.1 39.3 36.8
2001 Legislative Yuan 68 30.2 87 38.7 46 20.4
Source: Wikipedia, Chinese Wikipedia
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study. One of the potential justifications for reasonably expecting power diffusion is the continual rise of 
DPP’s popularity. It can be observed from the Table that DPP rose quickly in power during its first few 
years of electoral participation. While in the 1989 election it only received 16.1% votes, this increased 
sharply to 31.7% in the 1992 election. At that point however, despite the advancement it had achieved, it 
was hardly in any position to challenge KMT, which secured 59.1% votes in the 1992 election, almost 
doubling DPP’s. In other words, DPP’s upward trend must continue beyond 1992 for it to remain a 
potential justification for reasonably expecting power diffusion. This did not happen. The percentage 
votes DPP received in the four subsequent elections in 1995, 1996, 1996, and 1998 generally settled at 
around 30% (with the exception of the 1996 presidential election, which was 21.1%), which means that 
DPP did not manage to make any progress within a lengthy six-year period. The results of the 1998 
election confirm that at that point KMT was still far more powerful than DPP, a situation not much 
different from that in 1992.  
Yet in the 2000 presidential election, KMT, which had so far never failed to secure majority votes 
in any major elections, received a stunningly poor 23.1% support rate. DPP’s Chen and Lu won the 
election with 39.1% votes, while independent candidates Soong and Chang finished in a close second 
place and founded the People First Party (PFP) afterwards.42 In order to explain this outcome, attention 
should turn away from DPP towards KMT itself, and in particular the history and significance of KMT 
factionalization after democratization, as a potential justification for reasonably expecting power diffusion. 
After the death of Chiang Ching-Kuo and his handpicked successor Lee Teng-hui became ROC’s 
president as well as KMT chairman in 1988, the balance of power between the mainlander group and the 
local Taiwanese group within KMT began to tilt in favor of the latter, which had long been politically 
suppressed. Lee, a local himself, immediately formed a 31-member Central Committee of which 16 
members were locals. He also pushed policies regarding mainland China, democratic reforms, and party 
restructuring that he and his more reform-minded coalition hold a very different stance from the 
                                                          
42 For the ease of illustration, Soong and Chang are placed under the ‘PFP’ column in Table 2, but actually the party was founded 
by Soong right after the 2000 presidential election. 
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conservative mainlanders. At the forefront of the conflict were the plan to substitute the Legislative Yuan 
for the National Assembly and the debate over the criteria and procedure for selecting KMT chairman and 
vice-chairman. Lee emerged as the winner subsequently but at the heavy expense of party unity. During 
the 14th Party Congress in 1993, KMT leadership was so divided that six legislators and some old guard 
members ended up quitting the party and formed a separate Chinese New Party (CNP). Other old guards 
who chose not to leave KMT formed a wide variety of political factions within the party, aiming at 
claiming some degree of political autonomy from the Lee-presided central leadership.43  
The impact of KMT’s internal struggles and that of CNP formation was significant but 
nevertheless not overwhelming at the time. The disunity within KMT often opened up opportunities for 
the minority DPP to form ad hoc voting alliances with some of its political factions within the legislature 
on a bill-by-bill basis.44 This allowed DPP considerable legislative success especially in areas concerning 
social welfare and environmental policies as well as corruption,45 but not so much in more politically 
salient and sensitive issues that may potentially alter the overall power structure among the parties. Also, 
since only a handful of mainlanders quitted KMT to form CNP, the latter remained to be a relatively 
small political force as reflected by the 13%-14% support level it was able to solicit in the 1995 and 1996 
elections. Moreover, as conservative old guards of an earlier era, CNP leadership were even further from 
DPP along the political spectrum than KMT under Lee, and thus an alliance between CNP and DPP was 
extremely unlikely.46 As such this wave of factionalization, which lasted till 1998 (when CNP popularity 
began to fade), failed to result in power diffusion -- KMT still emerged as the dominant party in the 1998 
legislative election. 
In 1999, in anticipation of the 2000 presidential election, it became increasingly apparent that the 
KMT veteran and popular mayor of Taipei City, James Soong, would emerge as the favorite KMT 
                                                          
43 Michael Ying-Mao Kau, "The Power Structure in Taiwan's Political Economy," Asian Survey 36, no. 3 (1996): 294. 
44 Kau, "Power Structure", 300. 
45 Kau, "Power Structure", 301. 
46 DPP leadership actually considered forming a coalition with CNP in 1996, though without much success. 
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candidate. In a surprising turn of events, however, Lee insisted that KMT must nominate the much less 
popular Lien Chen as the party’s presidential candidate, and the subsequent effort by Lien to secure 
Soong as his running partner also failed. Soong then decided to run for presidency as an independent, 
resulting in his expulsion from the party. This highly publicized series of messy happenings naturally 
turned away many voters, yet even with the split of KMT votes between the two presidential candidates 
Soong only lost the race by 2.5% to DPP’s Chen. It can be conjectured that in the absence of this internal 
fight KMT would have won the presidential race by a landslide.  
Therefore, the critical factor that determined the expectation of power diffusion among political 
parties in Taiwan throughout the time period was the nature and degree of factional disputes within KMT. 
In the mid-90s, the CNT and the old guards within KMT did not make a great-enough impact, but by the 
turn of the century the exodus of Soong almost halved the political power of KMT by splitting it into two 
bitterly antagonistic parties each of which had a substantial base of popular support. Having said that, it is 
still doubtful that by the completion of the 2000 presidential election, power diffusion had indeed become 
a reasonable expectation, because the political power of Soong and his faction as a new party (instead of 
Soong himself as a presidential candidate) likely remained a considerable uncertainty. It is arguably not 
until, at best, the 2001 legislative election, in which the PFP obtained a third-ranked but substantial 20.4% 
votes, that the expectation of a longer-term and relatively stable power balance between DPP and KMT 
reasonably emerged, despite the fact that it turned out incorrect.47 In conclusion, single party dominance 
in Taiwan lasted until 2000, and power diffusion between the two major political parties could be 
expected by 2001. 
III.a.ii. State-Corporate Power Diffusion 
One of the major ideas presented in this study is the alternative conception of power diffusion, 
not among political parties but between the single-party controlled state and the corporate sector, which 
may nonetheless contribute to judicial independence. However, unlike power diffusion among political 
                                                          
47 In 2008, DPP lost the presidential race as well as the legislative election, in which DPP won a mere 27 seats versus KMT’s 70, 
largely due to the scandals surrounding President Chen during his second term. PFP’s popularity also did not last. It only won 1 
seat in the 2008 legislative election. However, these outcomes were unlikely foreseeable in 2001.  
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parties which can be inferred from election results, the power balance between the party-state and the 
corporate, and in particular whether corporate power has matured enough to challenge the party-state in 
the context of the developmental state, is more difficult to measure and operationalize. In the present 
study, expert opinions are relied upon instead. Specifically, the objectives are to determine whether there 
are good rationales in speculating an uptrend in corporate power, and whether there is a general consensus 
among area experts regarding the sufficient strength of the corporate sector. 
In the developmental state literature, it is widely recognized that the private sector plays only a 
minor role in explaining Taiwan’s spectacular economic growth. After the ROC regime had moved to 
Taiwan in 1949, the relationship between the mainlanders in power (i.e. KMT) and the local Taiwanese 
public had all along been antagonistic, and therefore forging some form of developmental alliance with 
the local private business sector did not emerge as a priority of KMT. Also, WWII had left Taiwan with 
too few resourceful local business leaders to worth KMT’s consideration anyway.48 Moreover, the 
sweeping land reform in the 1950s further curtailed the influence of the local landowning elite. As such, 
the strategy pursued by the Taiwanese developmental state beginning in the 1960s was characterized by 
industrial policies that channeled capital to selected (mainly upstream) industries occupied by state-owned 
and KMT-owned enterprises, exploiting scale economy, cheap financing, and other forms of protections. 
The private business sector mainly owned the downstream industries. Due to the scarcity of capital, it was 
highly fragmented with small businesses, although as the economy progressed some family-owned 
diversified business groups expanded to the midstream industries as well.49 This lack of a significant role 
of the private corporate sector is indeed a correct depiction of Taiwan’s political economy during its 
highest growth period from the late 1950s to the mid-1980s. Against this backdrop however, some 
scholars highlight the dramatic rise of private corporations and conglomerates beginning in the late 1980s 
and throughout the 1990s, so much so that the authority of the party-state was often challenged. Haggard, 
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for example, noted that ‘the growth of large firms provided new opportunities for business to air its 
grievances about governmental policies, lobbying for continued support’, and that ‘[as] the quest for 
sources of political funding became more intense… the autonomy of the technocrats vis-à-vis business 
interests declined.’50 Koo & Kim also places Taiwan alongside South Korea in terms of ‘big businesses… 
pursuing their independence from state control beginning in the 1980s.’51 Other scholars who specialize in 
Taiwan such as Fields, Tsai, Chu, Wu, and Kau also express similar concerns.52 
Taken together, there are three different rationales that explain the rise of private corporate power 
in Taiwan in the late 1980s. The first is a state-initiated effort to improve economic efficiency, based on 
the observation that public enterprises are oftentimes not the best competitive vehicle in terms of 
participating in an increasingly globalized world market. According to Tsai, the Taiwanese state had 
already recognized this problem in the early 1980s, and engaged in a round of restructuring the public 
enterprises aiming at efficiency improvement.53 However, as Taiwan had continually felt the imminent 
need for industrial upgrading throughout the 1980s, Chu explains that it could no longer rely on the state-
owned and party-owned enterprises to pursue ‘the dynamics and complexity of technology intensive 
industries.’54 Fields documents that the traditional developmental state in Taiwan aforementioned more or 
less operated under the framework provided by the 1960 Statute for the Encouragement of Investment 
(SEI). However, in 1990 the SEI was replaced by the Statute for Upgrading Industries (SUI) that provided 
the policy framework to ‘incubate a new generation of high-technology firms capable of participating in 
global value chains as highly flexible OEM suppliers’,55 a critical event that marked the inclusion of (and 
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reliance upon) private business groups into the state-business developmental alliance. In fact, according to 
Kondoh, the SUI resulted in the first place from extensive discussions between the bureaucrats and the 
private sector business leaders.56  
The second rationale is a US-induced effort to maintain international trade relationship. While 
Fields sees economic globalization as the underlying driving force, Tsai emphasizes more on international 
politics when it comes to explaining the economic liberalization initiatives that is also crucial to the assent 
of corporate power in Taiwan. According to Tsai, it is not the case that the Taiwanese state bureaucrats 
adopted wholesale a neoliberal worldview in response to economic globalization in the late 1980s, and 
then proceeded to pursue privatizations alongside the role expansion of the private sector. Instead, 
privatization can be traced back to Taiwan’s chronically large trade surplus, excessive savings, and 
relatively weak domestic demand for goods and services,57 which were common symptoms among all the 
East Asian developmental states. In particular, its annual trade surplus with the US had escalated 
drastically since the early 1980s, peaking at (nominal) USD 17.2 billion in 1987,58 prompting the US to 
retaliate (against S. Korea and Japan as well). The bilateral negotiations took place in 1986, in which 
Taiwan was in no position to bargain with the US since the US was an overwhelmingly large market to 
absorb Taiwan’s exports. US targeted at the appreciation of the Taiwanese dollar, various kinds of 
market-opening measures, and privatization initiatives.59 What is of particular importance here was that 
due to the US initiative which included pressuring for liberalizing the financial markets in Taiwan, the 
Securities Transactions Law was passed in 1988 which led to a proliferation of security houses60, while 
fifteen new private banks were opened in 1991-1992.61 Benefiting from these reforms, the corporate 
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availed themselves to flexible capital market instruments and enjoyed alternative sources of funding, 
greatly reducing its reliance on the state, while the state’s control over the financial system was 
essentially dismantled. 
It is noteworthy that both of the rationales fit the theoretical framework presented earlier in this 
study not because the corporate somehow attains power diffusion vis-à-vis the state, but because they 
imply that this outcome of power diffusion remains an extension of the maturation of the developmental 
state. Even though Taiwan deviates somewhat from the archetype developmental state narrative in that it 
had been powered mainly by public enterprises for several decades, as the developmental state matured in 
terms of industry upgrading it was compelled to include the private corporate sector into the core of its 
business-state alliance; and as the developmental state matured in terms of producing an extraordinarily 
successful export sector, the resultant neoliberal retaliation from its major trading partner again 
empowered the private corporate sector via financial liberalization. Yet, historically idiosyncratic factors 
also played a role in the rise of private corporate power during the time period, cumulating into a third 
rationale – a Lee-initiated strategy to reconfigure political coalition.  
It is mentioned in the previous section that after Lee had assumed presidency in 1988, he led a 
Taiwanese faction within KMT that fought against the mainlander faction, and eventually won. Tsai sees 
as a main reason behind this victory his effort in forging a broader coalition, incorporating diverse local 
interests that mainly included businessmen of Taiwanese origin.62 Chu also sees this as a watershed event 
that marks the beginning of the corporate’s perforation into the party-state apparatus.63 Under this 
arrangement, Lee brought these Taiwanese businessmen into KMT and the Legislative Yuan. In exchange 
for their political support, he distributed numerous public projects via the executive branch, as well as 
suppressing labor. Table 3 presents data supplied by Tsai.64 Government expenditure as a percentage of 
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national income, which had been around the 20+% range and was 23.9% at 1988, suddenly jumped to 
35.7% in 1989 (the first full year of Lee’s presidency), and had remained above 30% until the Asian 
Financial Crisis in 1997. Until 1995, this fiscal expansion was largely attributed to increased spending in 
public infrastructure and the acquisition of private lands for such projects.65 This coalitional strategy also 
took great advantage of the scenario engendered by the second rationale. First, the fiscal expansion was 
conveniently financed by issuing public bonds at low interest rates, exploiting the low domestic demand 
and high saving rate of the Taiwanese public. This also avoided printing extra money, which may 
otherwise impede the appreciation of the Taiwanese dollar as demanded by the US. Secondly, although 
the financial and other sectoral liberalization and privatization programs were imposed by the US, Lee 
fully welcomed them since the rents released by the process can be translate into valuable political capital 
in support of financing his broad coalition. As a result, Lee’s coalitional strategy ‘strengthened the 
economic and political influence of these private conglomerates’.66 
 
 
 
Taken together, the expert opinions that contribute to this niche literature do not diverge when it 
comes to the significant and growing corporate power in Taiwan beginning in the late 1980s. All of them 
more or less conform to what Fields describes as a migration from a state-led system to a ‘co-governed’ 
system.67 Although they present different explanations that account for the phenomenon, the three 
rationales are not mutually exclusive. They each present a solid standpoint upon which one may 
reasonably believe that the state-corporate power diffusion was indeed fast becoming a reality during the 
early 1990s. Moreover, in each of the three scenarios, the state was actively participating in empowering 
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Table 3: Government Expenditure as % of National Income (1985-1998)
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
25.3 26.0 23.1 23.9 35.7 30.2 33.5 35.8 35.8 33.9 32.9 30.5 29.2 28.2
Source: Tsai, "Dependency", 368.
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the corporate, even though its purpose resided in something else. It is therefore likely that the state was 
fully aware of the potential threat of a rising corporate power as a consequence, and would thereby act 
accordingly to mitigate the problem in a timely fashion, including the strategic use of judicial 
independence.  
III.a.iii. Dedicated Senior Judiciary Leadership 
Regarding this condition, the first task is to verify which of the three scenarios outlined in Section 
II.a. the case of Taiwan should fall under. Between Taiwan’s democratization in 1986 and the year 1994, 
Lin Yang-kang served as the President of the Judicial Yuan. Although Lin was no doubt one of the top 
leaders of KMT, serving as its Vice-Chairman between 1993 and 1995, he had no legal career background 
or formal legal education. More importantly, Lin had been eyeing for the 1996 presidential election since 
1990, and he subsequently resigned his presidency (of the Judicial Yuan) in 1994 in preparation for the 
race.68 Lin’s judiciary leadership was therefore senior but not dedicated. Empowering the judiciary with 
independence would neither fulfill his ambition nor fit his relatively short time horizon in heading the 
Judicial Yuan. Separately, it is known from the previous section that starting from the late 1980s the 
private corporate sector began to gain power, and therefore at some point thereafter KMT leadership 
would be considering granting judicial independence. It is therefore clear that from this point in time 
onwards until Lin’s departure, Taiwan fell under the ‘third scenario’ (see Section II.b.), in which Lin 
would unlikely pursue judicial independence. Moreover, Lin was arguably the greatest political rival of 
President Lee within KMT, and it would not be easy for Lee to seek Lin’s cooperation in reforming the 
judiciary in any case. 
Since it is the third scenario that is relevant here, the condition yet to be fulfilled was an 
opportunity to replace Lin. This opportunity came on June 10th 1994 when Lin announced his 
resignation.69 The theory predicts that since at that point all three conditions had been fulfilled, KMT 
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leadership would proceed by negotiating with and appointing a dedicated senior judiciary leadership. By 
September 1st 1994, Shih Chi-yang assumed his office as the President of the Judicial Yuan. Shih was 
also a very senior figure within KMT, whose political career included a stint as the Vice Chairman of the 
Executive Yuan between 1988 and 1993. In addition, he received his doctoral degree in law in Heidelberg, 
Germany, and had been a law school professor before entering politics. At the age of 60 while taking up 
his presidency in the Judicial Yuan, he had every reason to expect it to be his last position before 
retirement. It was therefore in his interest that the Constitutional Court and the ordinary courts (both are 
under the Judicial Yuan) be empowered with unconditional independence. Shih was clearly both senior 
and dedicated.  
III.b. Unconditional Independence in the Ordinary Courts 
Once the three conditions have been fulfilled, the theory predicts that KMT leadership would find 
ways to credibly commit itself to granting unconditional judicial independence, beginning at the ordinary 
courts. This subsection of the study is devoted to documenting and evaluating those observed actions as 
empirical evidences that support this prediction, with close attention to the formal rules involved. 
Nevertheless, the expected timing of those actions should first be clarified. The previous subsections 
conclude that: 1) single party dominance in Taiwan persisted until 2001; 2) the expectation of power 
diffusion between the corporate and the state took place after 1990; 3) a senior and dedicated judiciary 
leadership had assumed office since September 1994. To be sure, it is difficult to pinpoint the exact 
timing to which the second conclusion refers, i.e. when exactly KMT leadership actively considered 
granting unconditional judicial independence due to expecting the said power diffusion, if the credible 
commitment theory is valid. As such, had it been true that a senior and dedicated judiciary leadership 
assumed office much closer to 1990, say in 1991, then the situation would impose a challenge for 
empirical analysis, because a relatively precise prediction regarding the timing of actions cannot possibly 
be conjectured. Fortunately, since a senior and dedicated judiciary leadership had not actually assumed 
office until the second half of 1994, the few years’ time span separating this event from those critical 
incidents that began empowering the corporate in 1989/1990 allows one to much more confidently expect 
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that by 1994 the expectation of power diffusion had already been adopted by KMT leadership, and 
therefore one may predict quite precisely that the required actions concerning judicial independence 
should begin around the time Lin resigned and Shih took office. This is indeed what happened. 
Between 1994 and 1995 a group of Taichung district court judges initiated two major reforms 
concerning formal rules – the case-assignment reform and the case-review reform, the latter being the 
more illustrative demonstration of credible commitment on the part of the judiciary leadership. The case-
review system refers to a formal rule that obliges all district court judges to submit their decisions and 
opinions to the Chief Judge of that same court for review (until the said judge has been promoted beyond 
a certain rank). Essentially, this rule allowed a relatively small number of partisan judges at the higher 
echelon of the system to greatly leverage their influence by directly obstructing the independent decision 
making of the reformist judges, who were mostly lowly ranked. In 1995, after debating about the issue at 
a judicial reform conference, the Judicial Yuan initially decided not to nullify this rule. The Taichung 
district court judges immediately protested and began to conduct their daily business without submitting 
anything for review. In response to this, Shih organized a survey issued to all judges at all levels of the 
judiciary, asking for their opinion regarding the issue. Not surprisingly, the overall majority did not favor 
the case review institution. Based on the survey results and against the general preferences of those in the 
Supreme Court and Supreme Administrative Court, Shih abolished the rule, effective at the beginning of 
1996. 
The incident offers empirical support for the credible commitment theory. It is beneficial to first 
briefly discuss the case-assignment reform here, although it will be covered again later. The Court 
Organization Law at the time stipulated that ‘all the judges in a [district] court are granted the right to 
decide on case-assignment matters by vote.’ In practice however, the Chief Judge of each district court 
(typically a conservative and a KMT loyalist) controlled the assignments, which were believed to be a 
major source of corruption and judicial bias.70 It is a telling illustration of the fact that even a clear and 
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specific formal rule of de jure judicial independence can be blatantly violated without much consequence 
when the pubic support of the court is low and dedicated judiciary leadership is absent. What is relevant 
about the case-assignment reform is that it took place earlier than the case-review reform, and therefore 
Shih likely understood that simply abolishing the case-review rule would not be the most effective. The 
theory predicts that at this stage of low judicial reputation, one way to credibly commit is to build an 
effective communications process around the formal rule (or in this case, the abolishment of the formal 
rule). So, instead of quietly eliminating it in an internal conference, Shih kept the rule and allowed the 
Taichung district court judges to protest against the decision, which of course attracted a lot of media 
attention. At this point Shih initiated the organization-wide survey that served two purposes. First, similar 
to the ‘prestigious international organization’ mentioned in the theory section, the survey was part of the 
communications process that provided legitimacy and justification to his subsequent decision upon the 
issue, and thereby making any subsequent act of reneging much costlier.  Second, the survey acted as a 
focal point that orchestrated the otherwise disconnected (mainly) district court judges into a collective 
voice of expressing their preference against the case-review rule. The end result of abolishing the formal 
rule with an almost fifty-year history again attracted a lot of media attention. Shih’s final decision should 
not be interpreted as involuntary by assuming that the results of the organization-wide survey revealed the 
majority preference of disliking the case-review rule, thus leaving Shih with no other choice. Just a year 
earlier in mid-1994 when Lin was still in office, the Judicial Yuan also issued an organization-wide 
survey concerning judicial self-governance – in particular asking whether the district court chief justice 
should be elected internally by the judges of that district court. Despite the majority of judges supporting 
the idea, the Judicial Yuan indefinitely postponed the consideration, the rather unconvincing reason given 
being the number of non-respondents and those who did not support the idea was, together, still 
‘substantial’.71 The fact that Shih was likely in a capacity to follow suit, but did not, is consistent with the 
credible commitment theory which says that his true preference was indeed to promote unconditional 
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independence via abolishing the case-review rule, while his sequence of actions reflected an attempt of 
credible commitment. Moreover, prior to December 1993 all the reformist judges who had chosen to 
protest against the system and fought for independence invariably ended up in punishment in one way or 
another.72 It is unlikely that the district court judges had the capacity to push through their intended 
reforms without the blessing of the judiciary leadership. 
Yet the above analysis begs a further question: how can it be confirmed that it is KMT leadership 
who wanted to pursue unconditional judicial independence and at the same time chose to pursue it 
through Shih, instead of simply Shih himself acting in accordance with his self-interest? The critical piece 
of evidence comes from the events associated with the ‘judicial self-governance constitutional 
amendment’ movement that took place in mid-1994, which on the outset seem to be unsupportive of the 
theory due to its eventual failure. This movement was arguably the most organized and ambitious attempt 
in the 1990s on the part of the reformist judges. The focus of the movement involved a letter of request 
co-signed by 550 judges (more than 50% of the total) in late April addressed to the National Assembly, 
asking for a constitutional amendment proposal that would improve judicial independence. The request 
successfully translated into Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 40 in May, motioned by 3 KMT-affiliated 
members of the National Assembly and co-signed by another 140, mostly KMT-affiliated, members. In a 
nutshell, the bill sought to establish that judicial administration (such as case assignments) should be 
determined democratically by ‘judges’ meetings’ (basically each judge holds one vote) and that personnel 
evaluations should be handled by an independent committee made up of judges, prosecutors, lawyers, and 
scholars. However, on June 15th the bill was voted down in the First Reading. What is peculiar though 
was that the three initiators of the amendment bill were all absent. Also, out of the 140 co-signers, only 34 
voted in support of it, almost all of whom were DPP and independent delegates.73 Apparently, a large 
number of KMT-affiliated delegates of the National Assembly were mobilized to vote against the bill in 
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short notice, presumably by KMT leadership.74 This observation seemingly suggests that KMT leadership 
did not want to promote judicial independence. Yet, on June 4th, President Lee said during an interview 
that the immediate priority of the government, after its near-completed constitutional reform, would be to 
pursue judicial reform.75 In late July, he nominated Shih to head the Judicial Yuan. On August 20th, 12 
days before taking office, Shih confirmed during an interview that at the meeting with Lee upon which his 
nomination was confirmed, Lee told him that his main mission would be judicial reform.76 This proved to 
be no mere rhetoric, judging from Shih’s subsequent involvements in the case-assignment reform in late 
1994, the aforementioned case-review reform in 1995, and the Personnel Review Council reform 
beginning in 1994, which were ironically not much different from the demands made in Constitutional 
Amendment Bill No. 40. Moreover, Shih’s pursuits were done without any observed complaints from the 
KMT leadership; and when he retired in 1999, he was succeeded by Weng Yue-sheng who was equally 
supportive of the reformist judges.77 These contrasting evidences make it much more convincing to argue 
instead that while KMT leadership indeed wanted unconditional judicial independence, it subsequently 
decided to keep any changes internal to the judiciary and to pursue its goal through the judiciary 
leadership instead of through constitutional amendments.78 Knowing that these were mutually exclusive 
choices, it made much more sense in terms of credible commitment to rely on Shih who was considerably 
autonomous and had a long-term interest in unconditional judicial independence than relying on the law-
making body. At the time Taiwan was in the midst of a transition in which the fading National Assembly 
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was to be replaced by the Legislative Yuan. As aforementioned, Lee’s new coalitional strategy included 
bringing prominent Taiwanese businessmen into the Legislative Yuan. Due to this, Tsai wrote that Lee 
often had to ‘effectively use his presidential power to outweigh the legislative pressure and protected [the] 
autonomy of the… executive branch’,79 clearly indicating that at some point during the 1990s, the 
corporate power within the Legislative Yuan had become substantial. Although this may or may not have 
already taken place by 1994, it is reasonable to assume that Lee was capable of making such anticipation 
and thereby decided that the Legislative Yuan provided a less prospective and more uncertain source of 
credible commitment.80 KMT leadership’s emphasis on Shih to improve credibility was further affirmed 
when Shih resigned from all his KMT titles right before he took office in the Judicial Yuan, which was 
not required by either law or convention at the time.81 He was also known for refraining from all social 
gatherings among the KMT senior officials.82 As such, when the actions promoting judicial independence 
are hereby being examined, they do not necessarily have to be directly exercised by KMT leadership or 
directly demonstrate credible commitment as long as Shih is shown to be involved, because Shih’s 
involvement was itself the credible commitment through which he acted on behalf of KMT leadership. 
Another landmark event is the case-assignment reform that took place in December 1993. Nine 
reformist judges from the Taichung district court held a press conference protesting against the Chief 
Justice-controlled case-assignment practice. On December 29th, after a few rounds of debate the Taichung 
district court agreed to vote among all the judges, with a result of 41:34, approving the transfer of the 
power of case assignment from the Chief Judge back to the ordinary judges. Wang reports that ‘many of 
the other district courts followed suit.83 This re-enforcement of a formal rule of de jure independence is 
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certainly an important contribution to unconditional independence of the district ordinary courts, but it 
also poses two potential challenges to verifying the credible commitment theory. First, the reform took 
place in December 1993 and succeeded, but that was eight months before Shih took office. Second, 
assuming that the public reputation of the court remained poor at the time, the theory predicts that the re-
enforcement of formal rules would not be effective without some act of credible commitment on the part 
of either the KMT leadership or the judiciary leadership. Yet both are seemingly absent in this case. 
These challenges can be resolved to a large extent by highlighting the fact that all of the district 
courts individually decided upon case assignment issues, including the case assignment practice itself, 
only once a year at a year-end meeting. In other words, the many other district courts that ‘followed suit’ 
must at least wait until year-end 1994 to pass the necessary resolution that transferred case assignment 
power back to the judges’ community.84 This means that aside from one exception, i.e. the Taichung 
district court, the bulk of the case assignment reform actually took place after Shih had become the 
president of the Judicial Yuan. Although he had the power to suppress the reform movement, he instead 
publicly endorsed the case assignment reform.85 Once Shih’s involvement in the process is confirmed, 
one may interpret the case assignment reform in year-end 1994 as an event that took place under the 
umbrella of KMT’s aforementioned use of Shih himself as a credible commitment device. Nonetheless, 
the case assignment reform remains only a qualified piece of evidence in support of the credible 
commitment theory, because the formal rule that underlies case assignment was part of the Court 
Organization Law that fell under the jurisdiction of the Legislative Yuan instead of Shih. Even if Shih had 
the power to uphold the law within the judiciary, the corporate sector could potentially change the law if 
it could gather enough influence within the legislature. 
Personnel issues pertaining to promotion and demotion comprise another important area that 
affects judicial independence. In fact, for a civil law system such as that in Taiwan, Russell writes that 
‘the danger point for judicial independence may be more in the process of promotion and career 
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advancement than initial appointment.’86 If the ordinary courts were to be empowered with unconditional 
independence in a comprehensive way, then the lowly ranked reformist judges could not simply be 
granted freedom in performing their daily tasks, but in the longer run must also be appropriately promoted 
in accordance with their performance. This had certainly not been the case before 1994, resulting in the 
reformist judges resigning or remaining at the lower echelon of the judiciary. The final authority in 
promoting, transferring, or demoting all personnel in the higher and lower courts resided with the 
Personnel Review Council of the Judicial Yuan. The Council was made up of 21 members, 10 of whom 
were supposedly elected internally by the judges. Specifically, 7 of these 10 elected members were 
supposed to be elected by the district court judges, but this had rarely been practiced. Instead these 7 
members were traditionally handpicked by the district court Chief Justices.87 In 1994 however, 3 
reformist district court justices somehow managed to participate as candidates and were elected. In 
subsequent years, Wang reported that almost all reformist candidates were unanimously elected into the 
Council.88 Although personnel decisions per se cannot be guided by clear and specific formal rules in 
order not to obstruct judicial independence, in this case the formal rule pertains to the selection procedure 
of the Council’s members, which can surely be clear and specific. The re-enforcement of this formal rule 
regarding the 7 elected members allowed alternative voices to be present within the Council. Although as 
a minority group the reformist Council members could not nominate anyone for promotion, they 
succeeded in vetoing certain promotions and more importantly, they provided transparency regarding the 
decision-makings of the otherwise black box-like Council.  
Similar to the case-assignment reform the undertakings here were attached with only limited 
communications strategies, and as such the involvement of the judiciary leadership as a way to credibly 
commit is crucial to interpreting the Personnel Review Council elections and appointments as empirically 
consistent with the theory. There are four points to highlight here. First of all, in general the timings 
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match, i.e. the reformist judges’ entry into the Council began in 1994 and continued thereafter, which 
corresponded with Shih’s tenure in the Judicial Yuan. Secondly, despite the previous point, the 1994 
Council election took place on August 19th, 12 days before Shih took office. So it is a bit controversial as 
to whether he was involved in that particular event. Since his presidency was confirmed in July, it is 
possible that Shih might have exerted some behind-the-scene support, but there is no evidence to confirm 
this speculation. Thirdly, it is nonetheless clear that he did not back up the district court Chief Justices in 
the subsequent years, otherwise it would be difficult for the reformist judges to continually participate or 
participate successfully in the Council elections. Finally, in 1998 Shih showed his most clear-cut support 
for the Personnel Review Council changes by directly appointing outspoken reformist judge Lu Tai-lang 
to head the Personnel Department of the Council that was in charge of all promotion proposals,89 which 
until then were inaccessible to the reformist group.90 Taken together, there are ample empirical evidences 
of Shih’s involvement. 
The judicial reforms that have so far been presented should not mislead the audience into 
believing that these are the only major judicial reforms in Taiwan during the 1990s; nor should it convey 
the impression that the mission of attaining judicial independence in the ordinary courts had been 
completed within Shih’s tenure. Nevertheless, it is true that in no other time periods during the decade 
had several judicial reforms specifically pertaining to judicial independence been introduced more or less 
concurrently. It is also true that although it would take some more years before democratic case 
assignments extended to the higher courts and that the Personnel Review Council was adequately 
represented by reformist judges, the reforms that took place mainly during the first two years of Shih’s 
tenure made a significant impact on the judiciary’s public reputation, a point to be empirically verified in 
the next subsection of the paper. 
 
                                                          
89 The Personnel Review Council was divided between the Personnel Department and the Review Department. The former was 
responsible for motions and the latter was responsible for approvals.  
90 Wang, "Rise of Judicial Politics", 84. 
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III.c. Public Reputation of the Judiciary 
The credible commitment theory predicts that a significant improvement in the public reputation 
of the judiciary in Taiwan should follow the judicial independence reforms that took place in the ordinary 
courts during 1994/1995. This section of the paper is devoted to seeking empirical evidences that verify 
this hypothesis. The time span between the two events should be flexible to a reasonable extent. While it 
is impossible to specify exactly how much time it would take before the public perception of the judiciary 
begins to improve, the claim of a causal relation between the two events would certainly become less 
convincing if the improvement only came many years after the initial judicial reforms. 
The empirical challenge in testing the hypothesis resides in the unavailability of directly relevant 
data. A number of surveys had been conducted in Taiwan that included questions associated with how the 
court was being perceived. However, these surveys were mostly completed after 2000. The only survey 
that had been conducted at least once in or before 1995 and at least once after 1995 is the ‘Taiwan Social 
Change Survey’ organized by Academia Sinica.91 However, the respective questions pertaining to the 
judiciary asked in this survey’s 1992, 1993 and 1998 rounds were very different, and therefore the results 
cannot be meaningfully compared.  
Without any reliable indicator of the judiciary’s public reputation during the relevant time period, 
the hypothesis can nonetheless be supported by an alternative piece of empirical evidence in conjunction 
with a conclusion established in Section III.b. This relevant piece of evidence points to the characteristics 
of the five presidents of the Judicial Yuan after Taiwan’s democratization in 1986, presented in Table 4. It 
is already aforementioned that Lin was senior but not dedicated, while Shih was both senior and dedicated. 
Of importance here is Weng who succeeded Shih in 1999 when the latter retired. Like Shih, Weng had a 
strong academic background in law, earning his doctoral law degree in Germany and taught at a 
Taiwanese law school. Moreover, he had served as a Grand Justice since 1972, and was 67 when he took 
over the presidency. He therefore definitely qualified for a dedicated judiciary leadership. Unlike Shih 
                                                          
91 http://www.ios.sinica.edu.tw/sc/ 
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however, Weng had minimal political presence outside the judiciary and was not a senior figure within 
KMT. In fact, he was not even a KMT member. This characteristic of a dedicated but non-party affiliated 
judiciary leadership is shared among all Judiciary Yuan presidents after Shih.92 
The relevance of this switch in appointment strategy in 199893 must be interpreted in light of the 
status quo appointment strategy adopted since 1994. The evidence presented in Section III.b. associated 
with the ‘judicial self-governance constitutional amendment’ movement establishes that KMT 
leadership’s strategic rationale for appointing a senior and dedicated judiciary leadership, i.e. Shih, was to 
credibly commit to granting unconditional independence to the ordinary courts. KMT leadership found 
this move necessary basically because the judiciary was lacking a good public reputation that would 
generate public support that in turn makes reneging costly, and so it must instead artificially manufacture 
this costliness through other means. If four years later KMT leadership abandoned this strategy by 
appointing a judiciary leadership without the ‘seniority’ element (seniority means seniority within KMT 
as previously defined), then it can only imply that the judiciary’s public reputation was perceived by 
KMT leadership as having significantly improved by 1998. 
 
 
 
To be more specific, the fact that KMT leadership no longer regarded ‘seniority’ as necessary 
may imply five different possibilities on the outset. This can be better illustrated with the aid of Figure 1, 
in which pathway 1 is the causal mechanism established by the existing exogenous cost literature and 
                                                          
92 Of the three presidents after Shih, only Lai had significant political presence outside of the judiciary. He had held various 
positions at the Ministry of Finance, the Taiwan Provincial Government, and the Executive Yuan before heading the Judicial 
Yuan. However, he too was not a member of any political party. 
93 Weng took office in 1999 but was officially nominated in December 1998 by President Lee. 
Table 4: Presidents of the Judicial Yuan since 1987
President Year Age1 Party Career Background Senior Dedicated
Lin Yang-kang 1987-1994 59 KMT Exe. Branch and KMT Yes No
Shih Chi-yang 1994-1999 60 KMT Exe. Branch and KMT; law professor Yes Yes
Weng Yue-sheng 1999-2007 66 None Career Judge; law professor No Yes
Lai In-jaw 2007-2010 61 None Executive Branch; law professor No Yes
Rai Hau-min 2010-present 71 None Lawyer No Yes
1  Age at the time of becoming the president of the Judicial Yuan
Source: Chinese Wikipedia, Baidu Baike
46 
pathway 3 is the alternative established in Section III.b.94 The first possibility is that powerful corporate 
forces managed to successfully put pressure upon KMT leadership to reverse its credible commitment 
strategy at the point Shih retired, and as a result a non-senior Weng was appointed. Although it was in the 
interest of Weng to promote judicial independence since he was dedicated, he was not powerful enough to 
resist any external political pressure. However, if this was indeed the case, then the event must be 
followed by KMT leadership instructing Weng to reverse the reforms Shih had previously achieved. Yet 
this did not take place, and therefore the first possibility is eliminated. The second possibility is that KMT 
leadership decided to rely on other means of credible commitment external to the judiciary (i.e. pathway 2 
in Figure 1), since a senior and dedicated judiciary leadership could at best only control things within his 
jurisdiction. For example, KMT leadership could enact legislations via the Legislative Yuan, aided by 
communication strategies that generate a focal point effect that in turn demonstrates credible commitment. 
However, if this was indeed the case, then one should see either the formal rules within the judiciary 
being transferred out of it, or both the other means of credible commitment and the dedicated and senior 
judiciary leadership being pursued simultaneously. Yet neither took place, and therefore the second 
possibility is eliminated.95 
 
 
                                                          
94 The pathway with senior and dedicated judiciary leadership can include strategies within it that bring about their own focal 
point effects, e.g. the case-review reform in 1995. 
95 In 1997, the National Assembly amended the ROC Constitution the fourth time since 1990, which included fixing the number 
of Grand Justices at 15 and eliminating the possibility of reappointment. However, these do not represent a transfer of formal 
rules from the Judicial Yuan. Also, the significance of the two amendments should not be overrated, because KMT had never 
abused the system along these two dimensions in the first place. Ever since the late 1950s, the number of Grand Justices has 
always been around 14-16 people, and reappointment rates have always been very low. Grand justices appointed in 1985 by 
Chiang had an average age of 65-66 when their terms ended in 1994, and those appointed in 1994 by Lee also had an average age 
of 65-66 by 2003, which made retirement more reasonable than serving another 8-year term. 
Public Support Costliness Judicial IndependencePublic Reputation
Focal Point Effects (external)
Senior & Dedicated Judiciary Leadership
1.
2.
3.
Figure 1: Pathways to Judicial Independence
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The third possibility is that judicial independence was somehow achieved even in the absence of 
the costliness of attacking the court. Essentially this means that some kind of endogenous benefit model 
must be at work, in which all the powerful entities including the corporate find it beneficial to have an 
independent court. This may be possible only if corporations collectively find corruption and other illegal 
corporate actions damaging. In this scenario, corporations encounter a prisoners’ dilemma in which they 
are better off not engaging in corruption than they do together, but each corporation is better off engaging 
in corruption if others don’t. The solution is to establish a court that significantly and effectively increases 
the cost of corruption via punishment, and possibly also having the corporations coordinating among 
themselves to impose punishment upon those members who engage in corruption. Naturally, each 
corporation has an interest to support judicial independence unless it is the one being prosecuted, in which 
case it will retaliate. As a result, the court can only prosecute a limited number of corporations regardless 
of how many of them engage in corruption, lest its independence would be at risk. This would result in 
multiple equilibria with different percentages of the corporate members engaging in corruption.96 In a 
high-corruption equilibrium (relative to the status-quo), although supposedly no one attacks the court the 
end goal of lowering corruption level is not attained after all, and therefore judicial independence would 
not be sustainable as the incentive to support it disappears. In a low-corruption equilibrium (relative to 
status-quo), judicial independence would indeed be sustainable. But if that is the case, and taken into 
account that coordination among the corporations is costly, then the implication is that a sustained and 
significant drop in corruption rate should be observed after 1994 and before 1998 (whereas the credible 
commitment theory does not imply such reduction). Given the proliferation of ‘Heijin’ (black-gold 
                                                          
96 If the corporations are homogenous, then under reasonable conditions the equilbria are 0% and 100% corruption. When no 
corporation engages in corruption, then none of them has the incentive to unilaterally deviate to corruption because the single 
corporation who does so would surely be prosecuted, and it is therefore not worth it. When every corporation engage in 
corruption, then none of them has the incentive to unilaterally deviate to no-corruption, because the chance of being caught is 
very small and therefore the expected return of corruption is higher than no-corruption. Realistically, the corporations are not 
homogenous, and therefore there can be >2 equilibria, each of which can locate anywhere between 0% and 100%. The effect of 
the corporations being able to coordinate punishment among themselves is the tendency to reduce the number of equilibira and 
shifts them towards the 0% end, thus increasing the chance of achieving the end-goal of a significantly lower corruption level. 
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politics)97 in Taiwan throughout the 1990s and thereafter, marked by infamous incidents such as the ‘High 
Court Judges Collective Corruption Case’,98 it was unlikely that the corporate had achieved such low-
corruption equilibrium. Further confirmation is presented in Table 5. Neither of the corruption indices 
displays a significant improvement during 1993-1998.99 
 
 
The fourth possibility is that some alternative means of achieving the aforementioned costliness 
was somehow discovered in lieu of both public support and senior and dedicated judiciary leadership, e.g. 
foreign intervention, such that KMT leadership may still achieve its goal of unconditional judicial 
independence without either the said public reputation or a senior judiciary leadership. However, if this is 
indeed the case, it must also fulfill three additional requirements. First, this alternative means must be 
absent on and before 1994-1995 but emerged some time before 1998. Second, after its emergence it must 
be expected to persist long-term. This requirement rules out speculations according to which the corporate 
sector refrained from obstructing judicial independence in order to help Taiwan’s accession to 
international organizations from which it would also benefit, because the corporate would be expected to 
behave otherwise ex-post and therefore it would not be rational for KMT to abolish its initial strategy in 
                                                          
97 According to Chin Ko-lin, ‘Black-gold politics’ is ‘the combination of politics, business, and gangsters’, pervasively engaging 
in clearly illegal activities. Ko-lin Chin, Heijin: Organized Crime, Business, and Politics in Taiwan (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe 
Inc., 2003). 
98 During 2000-2002, Hung, the chairman of the board of director of a Taiwanese tea company, and Ho, a KMT legislator whose 
wife was a board director of that same company, blackmailed the bureaucrats in charge of managing the Hsinchu Science and 
Industrial Park. They requested that the tea company be paid an extra bonus of around TWD 223 million in a transaction in which 
the Hsinchu Science and Industrial Park bought land from the tea company in its expansion plan. Ho exploited his role as a 
member of the Information Technology Committee in the Legislative Yuan by threatening to cut the budget for the Hsinchu 
Science Park Bureau if the request was not met. When the case was brought to the court, Hung and Ho spent TWD 8.5 million 
bribing four High Court judges to declare them innocent. All the people involved were arrested in 2010 and imprisoned in 2013. 
Source: Taiwan Supreme Court press releases, Chinese Wikipedia. 
99 The standard errors of the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index figures range from 0.8 to 1.2.  
Table 5: Corruption Indices for Taiwan, 1993-2002
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
5.8 3.5 4.4
5.1 5 5 5.3 5.6 5.5 5.9 5.6
World Competitiveness Yearbook 
Improper Practices Rating (0 
(worst) to 10 (best))
Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index (0 
(worst) to 10 (best))
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the first place.100 Third, this alternative source of costliness must be comprehensive, in the sense that 
whichever way judicial independence is being obstructed, it would be costly. For example, the senior and 
dedicated judicial leadership appointment is not comprehensive, because it makes it costly to obstruct 
judicial independence only when matters within the control of the judiciary leadership are involved; 
whereas good public reputation for the court is very comprehensive, because it imposes costliness 
however the court is being attacked (as long as it is known). In order to convince KMT leadership to 
abandon its strategy of appointing senior and dedicated judiciary leadership, which had been crucial to 
nurturing the judiciary’s public reputation (and therefore public support) since 1994 but supposedly 
hadn’t yet succeeded, the alternative source of costliness must be at least as comprehensive as the public 
support engendered by good reputation. The argument here is that meeting all three requirements is very 
difficult, making this possibility extremely unlikely. 
The fifth and only remaining possibility is simply that the public reputation of the judiciary had 
already improved by 1998 and therefore the ‘seniority’ element of the judicial leadership was no longer 
necessary. The ‘dedication’ element was still needed as judicial independence reforms were to be 
continued. Since the other four possibilities turn out to be either impossible or extremely unlikely, it can 
be concluded from the empirical evidence of Weng’s appointment, with near certainty, that this fifth 
possibility must indeed be the empirical truth. In fact, it can even be argued that Weng’s appointment 
constitutes a superior piece of evidence than a trend of improved reputation revealed by some potentially 
available survey results, because the survey results would at best point to an improvement in reputation, 
but not necessarily an improvement beyond the level at which KMT leadership would believe is enough 
to secure unconditional independence for the ordinary courts. It is this more precise specification of 
public reputation improvement that is relevant to the reputation hypothesis and for which the Weng 
appointment offers evidential support. 
                                                          
100 For example, Taiwan’s application to WTO membership was approved in November 2001. To appoint a non-senior judiciary 
leadership in 2008 would be risky for KMT leadership, because post-2001 the costliness of the corporate sector attempting to 
obstruct judicial independence would be greatly reduced, but there would still be a good number of years before Weng retired. 
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Finally, it should be highlighted that Shih resigned on December 2nd 1998,101 and by December 
4th, Weng’s nomination had already been confirmed.102 It is unlikely that Shih, who unlike his predecessor 
Lin had a good politically relationship with President Lee, would notify the public of his resignation 
without first discussing his intention with Lee much in advance. Neither is it likely that the new judiciary 
leadership could be determined within two days. Therefore the moment KMT leadership first considered 
a dedicated but non-senior judiciary leadership must be substantially earlier than December 2nd -- 
probably some time around mid-year in 1998, which marks the latest possible time judiciary reputation 
had significantly improved. 
III.d. Constitutional Court Independence 
The credible commitment theory predicts that the constitutional court should begin acting 
independently immediately or shortly after the significant improvement in judiciary reputation. This 
subsection of the paper is devoted to verify this hypothesis. The task is to determine when Taiwan’s 
Council of Grand Justices (‘Council’ hereon) began to demonstrate independence from KMT and the 
KMT-controlled party-state, and compare this result with the conclusion from the previous subsection 
regarding judicial reputation improvement. 
The systematic measurement of constitutional court independence, even as a dummy variable, 
presents a challenge. It is clear from Table 6 that it is not reliable to utilize dissenting opinions to indicate 
judicial independence. During 1976-1985 when Taiwan was still under the autocratic rule of a political 
strongman and the Council was indisputably subservient, the percentage of unanimous opinions was 44%, 
much lower than the 79% achieved during 2004-2008 when the Council had doubtlessly achieved a 
higher degree of independence. The number of interpretations, which is arguably a good indicator of one 
dimension of judicial activism, is not any better. Although judicial independence is a form of, and 
therefore implies, judicial activism, the reverse is not true. 
                                                          
101 Kong-zhong Liu and Wang Hong-xia, "60 Years of Taiwan Judicial Reform: The Implementation and Challenges of Judicial 
Independence (in Chinese), " Dong Fang Fa Xue 4 (2011): 72. 
102 "Shih is Glad that his Resignation was Approved (in Chinese), " Unknown narrator, Taiwan Television Company, December 4, 
1998. 
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Garoupa, Grembi, and Lin, who offer the only ‘empirical study on the relationship between 
Grand Justices and party politics [up to 2011]’,103 determine independence based on, for each case, the 
relation between the party affiliation of the petitioner(s) and that of the President who appointed the 
presiding Grand Justices, e.g. if the petitioner is affiliated with KMT and the presiding Grand Justices are 
appointed by a KMT President, then a vote for unconstitutionality would be considered acting in 
accordance with KMT's preference, and a vote for constitutionality would be considered otherwise. 
However, although it is claimed that their database only includes cases of ‘obvious political content’ and 
‘do not require second-guessing concerning the political interests involved’,104 in actuality it suffers from 
several problems. First, in some cases KMT’s preference is by no means clear-cut (e.g. Interpretation No. 
371); in other cases, it is not obvious whether the Council has acted for or against KMT (e.g. 
Interpretation No. 380). Second, the analysis fails to take into account the large variation in the political 
salience of the cases, e.g. Interpretation No. 499, which declared the 1999 constitutional amendment 
unconstitutional, is obviously many times more important politically than Interpretation No. 365 which 
struck down a law that privileged the father over the mother regarding parental rights. Third, certain 
obviously important and relevant cases are somehow missing from the database, e.g. Interpretation No. 
384 struck down five articles of the ‘Anti-Hooligan Law’ that had allowed the police to detain without a 
judicial warrant any persons deemed as ‘hooligans’, and also began a decade-plus-long tug-of-war 
between the Council and the Legislative Yuan that also involves Interpretation No. 523 and No. 636. 
Interpretation No. 445, in which the Council essentially sympathized the communists in terms of their 
                                                          
103 Garoupa, Grembi, and Lin, "Explaining Constitutional Review", 17. 
104 Garoupa, Grembi, and Lin, "Explaining Constitutional Review", 18. 
Table 6: Diversity in Constitutional Interpretations
3rd term: 4th term: 5th term: 6th term:
1967-1976 1976-1985 1985-1994 1994-2001 2004-2008
Number of Interpretations 2 32 149 167
Percent Unanimous (%) 0 44 58 48 79
Source: Ginsburg, Judicial Review in New Democracies , 128.
Garoupa, Grembi, and Lin, "Explaining Constitutional Review", 20.
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right to organize public rallies, is also missing. In general, the issues of which cases are political salient, 
which cases demonstrate a clear preference on the part of KMT, and which cases demonstrate decisions 
against KMT’s preference on the part of the Council all seem to require case-by-case judgments, while 
any formulaic approach would risk generating serious measurement errors.  
The method adopted in this subsection employs a qualitative approach instead and would limit the 
analysis to a smaller number of cases. It aims at selecting hopefully close to all of the prominent cases 
handled by the Council in relation to judicial activism between 1990 and 2001,105 taking advantage of the 
aforementioned fact that judicial independence must imply judicial activism in the context of single party 
dominance. Expert opinions from five different sources are relied upon in selecting these cases. The first 
is Ginsburg’s book chapter on the history and development of the Council. The second is a roundtable 
discussion between Ginsburg and a group of East-Asian legal scholars. The third is a paper written by 
Chu, a local scholar, on the Council’s judicial activism. The fourth includes two book chapters written by 
Hwang, Liao, and Chang on the development of constitutional law and human rights in Taiwan. The fifth 
is a paper written by Chang on judicial review in Taiwan. All of the sources were written after 2001 and 
discuss extensively about the Council’s judicial activism via its Interpretations. The collection here 
gathers all of the Interpretations mentioned in these sources (all together 43 of them), and each is 
examined individually for supporting evidences of the Council demonstrating either judicial 
independence (assigned ‘1’) or subservience (assigned ‘-1’). The criterion for ‘judicial independence’ is 
that the Council’s decision goes against KMT’s preference in a politically salient case. As 
aforementioned, the political salience, KMT’s preference, as well as the alignment of the Council’s 
decision with KMT’s preference are discerned subjectively on a case-by-case basis. The purpose of the 
exercise is to see if a sufficiently clear pattern of cases that demonstrate judicial independence emerges 
from the analysis. The Interpretations and their associated comments are presented in the Appendix. 
                                                          
105 2001 is the year when single party dominance of KMT ended as concluded in Section III.a.i. 1990 is just an arbitrary year 
chosen before which it was highly unlikely that the Council enjoyed any judicial independence. 
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It is noteworthy that a politically salient case in which the Council’s decision is in compliance 
with KMT’s preference does not necessarily demonstrate subservience, because it is possible that the 
Council was acting independently and in accordance with its own jurisprudential disposition but it just 
happened that this decision aligned with KMT’s preference.106 To be sure, the same case does not 
demonstrate the Council’s independence either. Coupled with the fact that the collection includes most if 
not all of the prominent cases of judicial activism and not only those of judicial independence, one should 
expect that many of the cases demonstrate neither independence nor subservience (assigned ‘0’). 
The comments and the assignments of independence/subservience (the last column) presented in 
the Appendix illustrate a few important trends. First, a slew of cases involving the protection of basic 
human rights, yet not politically salient, emerged between 1991 and 1993. At the time, KMT was tested in 
several nation-wide elections (the 1991 National Assembly and the 1992 and 1995 Legislative Yuan 
elections) amidst DPP’s fast-rising popularity. The party-state was in urgent need to rid itself from a 
number of its previous unreasonable practices that infringed upon basic human rights, in order to enhance 
popularity and attract votes, as long as the elimination of such practices insignificantly hampered its 
power. These are mostly politically trivial cases, such as ensuring people who did not promptly pay their 
taxes that they would nonetheless collect administrative welfare benefits when needed (Interpretation No. 
321), or ensuring that retired civil servants would receive enough retirement funds to meet a certain living 
standard (Interpretation No. 280), or prohibiting bankrupt fugitives from being imprisoned indefinitely 
(Interpretation No. 300). Other cases that lack political salience include Interpretation No. 313, No. 365, 
No. 371, No. 373, No. 382, and No. 472. All of these cases fail to demonstrate the Council’s 
independence from KMT. 
Second, throughout the time period covered, there have been many cases that demonstrate 
judicial activism or even significant empowerment that nevertheless should not be mistaken to be 
independence. The reason behind the Council’s activism, as suggested by Chang, was that the political 
                                                          
106 There is no fixed criterion for judicial subservience in the analysis.  
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turbulence and transformation that took place during that decade forced KMT leadership to engage in 
‘political deals and subsequent reforms that would not be entirely clear, thus leaving a great deal of 
[constitutional] ambiguities or inconsistencies subject to judicial interpretations or even interventions… 
even [generating] institutional discrepancies mostly with regard to governmental structures.’107 Assuming 
this new role, the Council served to settle disputes within the government (Interpretation No. 325, No. 
387, No. 419, No. 520) and help clearing the way for political reforms (Interpretation No. 261). It might, 
through this process, occasionally gain power against other branches (Interpretation No. 251), or 
empower itself vis-à-vis other courts within the judiciary (Interpretation No. 242, No. 392, No. 436). 
Nevertheless, all of these cases merely demonstrate the Council’s activism and relative empowerment 
within a larger system that was still firmly controlled by KMT. It can be said that the Council identified a 
prominent role in serving the dominant party, but it did not demonstrate through these cases an 
independence from KMT. 
In addition, there are a few cases in which the Council seemingly was proactively ruling against 
certain politically important institutions of social control favored by the KMT-controlled state, while in 
fact it was merely addressing some technical inconsistencies within the existing law (Interpretation No. 
380, No. 394).  
Finally, the cases that truly demonstrate the Council’s independence are identified to be 
Interpretation No. 384 in 1995, No. 445 and No. 450 in 1998, No. 499 in 2000, and No. 523 in 2001. 
Ideally, a certain year would be identified before which there were no cases at all that demonstrate 
independence and after which there were many that are also chronologically clustered. This would be the 
ideal pattern. In the results here, the latter four cases are relatively close to each other time-wise, and 
therefore the beginning of 1998 seems to be the time when the Council first demonstrated judicial 
independence. The reason why 1998 is a better choice than 1995 is that the case in 1995 seems to be a 
relatively isolated incident followed by a relatively long time span before the next incident of 
                                                          
107 Ginsburg et al., "Judicial Review", 170. 
55 
independence, during which a case that demonstrates subservience took place in late 1996 (Interpretation 
No. 419). These two characteristics make it reasonable to interpret the 1995 incident of independence, 
though genuine, as idiosyncratic and not systematic. As such, although the pattern would be much more 
clear-cut if there are more ‘1’ cases during the period immediately after 1998 and if the 1995 case is 
absent, the existing overall pattern nonetheless still suggests early 1998 as the moment judicial 
independence dawned upon Taiwan’s constitutional court. Furthermore, it is already concluded in Section 
III.c. that judicial reputation significantly improved, at the latest, some time during 1998 but earlier than 
late 1998. Therefore although strictly speaking it is still possible that judiciary reputation came after the 
Council’s independence (e.g. the former in mid-1998 while the latter in early 1998), the boundary values 
of the two events are close enough to conclude that they took place roughly at the same time/year, thus 
offering empirical support to the hypothesis associated with this subsection. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Contrary to Lin Yang-kang’s famous assertion that ‘judicial [independence] is like Caesar’s wife 
whose chastity must be above suspicion’, the attainment of judicial independence in reality is often rare 
and hard-earned. It is therefore an important and meaningful exercise to learn from historical experience 
and identify the various causal mechanisms through which it can be achieved. This paper argues that even 
under single (political) party dominance, the ordinary courts and the constitutional court in a newly 
democratized setting can nonetheless attain judicial independence as long as the regime is a mature 
developmental state standing in tension with a powerful private corporate sector. A theoretical framework 
that is based on an alternative interpretation of power diffusion and employs different forms of credible 
commitment strategies is constructed to explain the emergence of judicial independence in Taiwan. The 
causal mechanism specified by the theory is tested by process-tracing: through a historical analysis of 
judicial reforms pertaining to the ordinary courts and a qualitative analysis of the Grand Justices’ 
interpretations mainly during the 1990s, ample empirical evidences supportive of the theory are identified. 
The paper fills a major gap in explaining the presence and absence of judicial independence among the 
East Asian developmental states.  
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APPENDIX:  COMMENTS ON SELECTED INTERPRETATIONS OF THE COUNCIL 
OF GRAND JUSTICES 
Inter-
pretation Date Source   Comment 
Indepen-
dence 
242 6/23/1989 1 
  
This is the first Supreme Court precedent to be declared unconstitutional, 
and as such the case has important implications towards the power 
balance between the Council of Grand Justices and the Supreme Court. 
But that is not relevant to the Council's independence from the party. Also 
the case (about marriage) is clearly not politically salient. 
0 
251 1/19/1990 3 
  
The Council ruled that the police had no authority to inflict punishment 
that restricted one's physical freedom; this authority should belong to the 
ordinary courts. Given that both the police and the ordinary courts likely 
were instruments of the KMT in 1990, this case has little relevance in 
terms of the Council's independence from the dominant party. 
0 
259 4/13/1990 4 
  
Hwang, Liao, and Chang provided the following note: 'Under article 113, 
§ 1, clause 2 of the 1947 ROC Constitution, the [regional] Governor shall 
be elected by a popular vote. Since 1947, such elections were never held. 
In addition, all the local elections held since 1950 were done under 
authorization of the national government--Executive Yuan. Such a 
practice and all such administrative regulations were even declared 
constitutional by the Council of Grand Justices [in Interpretation No. 
259].' (Hwang, Liao, and Chang, 61-62) This decision was therefore an 
indication of subservience, mainly because the Council upheld something 
that was too obviously unconstitutional, according to these legal experts. 
-1 
261 6/21/1990 1,3,4 
  
Despite the obvious political significance of this Interpretation, this case 
does not demonstrate judicial independence from KMT. The dominant 
party was in great need of new blood while those delegates elected in 
1947 were old and dying. President Lee, in charge of KMT, was 
aggressively pursuing Taiwanization. The Grand Justices were simply 
acting in the interest of KMT by ordering the members of the national 
representative bodies to leave office by the end of 1991. 
0 
274 2/22/1991 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
275 3/8/1991 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
277 3/22/1991 4 
  
The Interpretation affirms that the central government's control over 
regional governments' finances was constitutional. Hwang, Liao, and 
Chang believe that it indeed was constitutional jurisprudentially speaking 
(Hwang, Liao, and Chang, 61), and as such this case is not relevant.  
0 
280 6/14/1991 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
283 8/6/1991 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
288 12/13/1991 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
291 2/28/1992 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
293 3/13/1992 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
294 3/13/1992 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
300 7/17/1992 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
306 10/16/1992 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
58 
Inter-
pretation Date Source   Comment 
Indepen-
dence 
313 2/12/1993 4 
  
'The Council decided in favor of the airline companies, holding that the 
conditions and the amount of fines imposed on the defiance of 
administrative duties must be prescribed by law. Even if the law granted 
the administrative agency the right to make a rule, the content and scope 
of that delegation must be clear and specific.' (Hwang, Liao, and Chang, 
102) Similar to Interpretation 380, the emphasis was on technical 
inconsistencies. The case was not related to judicial independence, and 
was not politically salient. 
0 
316 5/7/1993 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
318 5/21/1993 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
320 6/18/1993 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
321 6/18/1993 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
325 7/23/1993 4 
  
The Council clarified the jurisdictions of the Control Yuan and the 
Legislative Yuan. It played the role of settling internal disputes within the 
government. There was no relevance to judicial independence. 
0 
334 1/14/1994 4 
  
The Executive Yuan and the Legislative Yuan had different opinions as to 
what should fall under the terms 'government bonds' and 'government 
debt', and asked the Council to adjudicate on the issue. The Council 
fulfilled its role in settling disputes within the KMT-controlled 
government, and therefore this case is irrelevant. 
0 
365 9/23/1994 2 
  
Professor Lee Ju-li lists this case as an example of the Council 
'demonstrating to the society that it is an independent political and legal 
institution…and protecting fundamental rights.' While the latter was 
demonstrated, the issue of the final right of decision in case of parental 
disagreement clearly lacks the political salience and relevance required to 
demonstrate the Council's independence.  
0 
371 1/20/1995 1,4,5 
  
It is difficult to judge whether KMT would be in support of striking down 
the provisions that prevented lower court judges from referring cases to 
the Council. But in any case, in light of the low response rate thereafter 
(only 12 petitions from the lower courts during the subsequent 10 years 
(Chang, 80)), this case can be deemed politically non-salient. 
0 
373 2/24/1995 1 
  
Ginsburg incorrectly describes Interpretation No. 373 as ‘allowing 
teachers to form unions and voiding provisions of the Labor Union Law to 
the contrary.’ (Ginsburg, 151) and associates the incident with opposing 
KMT’s ‘authoritarian corporatism’. Instead, Interpretation No. 373 
allowed ‘technicians and journeymen’ of the education industry, a much 
less politically salient group, to form unions, because they were deemed 
not directly connected to education. KMT’s policy of not allowing 
teachers to form unions was not at all challenged, as this was deemed in 
conflict with the citizen’s right to be educated. 
0 
59 
Inter-
pretation Date Source   Comment 
Indepen-
dence 
380 5/26/1995 1 
  
The Council in effect freed the universities from the Education 
Department’s mandating of required subjects. Ginsburg’s interpretation is 
that the Council ‘sought to dismantle the mechanisms of [KMT’s] 
authoritarian control’ that included ‘ideological courses in Sun Yat-sen’s 
thoughts (Ginsburg, 150).  While Sun Yat-sen’s thoughts are rarely 
associated with authoritarian control, the even more important point is 
that in this case the Council merely pointed out certain technical 
inconsistencies between the University Act and the ‘Enforcement Rules’ 
section of the University Act, instead of seeing the mandate of required 
subjects itself being in violation of any fundamental rights stipulated in 
the Constitution. Time and again the Interpretation emphasizes that ‘A 
university shall… to the extent permitted by law [italics added], be 
entitled to the right of self-government’, which means that if the KMT-
dominated legislature so desired, it could amend the University Act so 
that the Education Department would have the power to mandate required 
subjects. As such, Interpretation No. 380 did not demonstrate that the 
Council attempted to act against KMT. 
0 
382 6/23/1995 2 
  
Professor Lee Ju-li lists this case as an example of the Council 
'demonstrating to the society that it is an independent political and legal 
institution…and protecting fundamental rights.' While the latter was 
demonstrated, the issue of whether an expelled student is entitled to bring 
an administrative appeal against the school clearly lacks the political 
salience needed to demonstrate the Council's independence.  
0 
384 7/28/1995 1,3,4 
  
The Council declared unconstitutional five articles of the ‘Antihooligan 
Law’, which allowed the police to detain without a judicial warrant any 
persons deemed as ‘hooligans’. Judging from the facts that: 1) this is a 
political salient issue with broad implications to civil rights, 2) the KMT-
dominated Legislative Yuan waited until one day before the Council-
imposed deadline to pass a new law that did not really address the issue, 
and 3) the Council struck down the new law with Interpretation 523, both 
Interpretations signfify judicial decisions against the preference of KMT, 
and thus demonstrate the Council's independence. 
1 
387 10/13/1995 4 
  
The newly elected but still KMT-dominated Legislative Yuan requested 
that the Premier should resign in accordance with the procedure of 
parliamentary democracy, while the Premier disagreed, arguing that he 
only answered to the President who appointed him. Hwang, Liao, and 
Chang commented that this is a 'salient case of judicial coordination of 
constitutional revisions' (Hwang, Liao, and Chang, 100-101). The Council 
played an important adjudication role in settling this internal dispute, but 
the case is not much related to independence. Neither was Lien Chen's 
resignation as the Premier a politically salient event, as he moved on to 
become the Vice President of Taiwan while Siu, another KMT member, 
became the Premier. 
0 
390 11/10/1995 3 
  
There is no evidence that the Council's decision was against KMT's 
preference. It can be argued that it was in the interest of KMT, and Lee in 
particular, to facilitate business-government relationship through clearer 
regulations. In addition, the case does not seem politically salient. 
0 
392 12/22/1995 1,4 
  
The Council ruled that prosecutors had no power to authorize detention of 
civilians without judicial warrants. This involved clarifying whether the 
prosecutors were to be included as part of the court, which was an internal 
affair of the judiciary. 
0 
60 
Inter-
pretation Date Source   Comment 
Indepen-
dence 
394 1/5/1996 1 
  
The Council did not rule that the Ministry of the Interior loses its power to 
make ‘regulations for the administration of the construction industry’, 
including the right to administrative reprimand towards certain 
technicians if they were unable to carry out their responsibilities ‘as a 
result of leaving the country or another reason’. It only decided that the 
statute was too vague, and required clarification. Ginsburg interpreted the 
condition regarding ‘leaving the country’ as KMT’s tactic to restrict 
people’s freedom of movement. But the actually text read ‘leaving the 
country… for over a month’. This substantial time span means that not 
many people would be affected, making it unlikely an intentional tool to 
restrict people’s freedom of movement. 
0 
419 12/31/1996 1,4 
  
This is a classic case in which the Council played the role of settling an 
internal conflict within the regime. The issue was whether Lien Chen 
could serve as the Vice-President of Taiwan and the President of the 
Executive Yuan simultaneously, with President Lee and the Executive 
Yuan on one side and the Legislative Yuan on the other. Clearly this case 
cannot demonstrate the Council’s independence regardless of its decision. 
However, unlike other similar cases the Council did not play its 
coordinator role well. Its long and notoriously ambiguous Interpretation 
actually offered some support to the criticism that the Council was, up to 
that point, a ‘tool of the mainstream faction of the KMT’ (Ginsburg, 153), 
afraid to offend either side. 
-1 
436 10/3/1997 1 
  
The Council held that military trials would remain outside the jurisdiction 
of the Judicial Yuan but were subject to appeal before ordinary courts. 
This was one major step towards consolidating the power of the Judicial 
Yuan, but it was not obvious that KMT had a preference against it.  
0 
443 12/26/1997 1 
  
The Council declared unconstitutional the prohibition of men to leave the 
country before they completed the required military service. Not 
politically salient. 
0 
445 1/23/1998 1 
  
The Council held that ‘effective immediately, police cannot disapprove 
applications for public rallies advocating secessionism and communism’, 
even though rallies advocating secessionism and communism remain 
illegal. This move was clearly acting against KMT, since the Council was 
not only in support of the right to organize public rallies (a collective 
action against the then-still-dominant KMT), but also allowing certain 
leeway to the communists despite KMT’s long-held antagonism against 
communism. The political salience was also apparent. 
1 
450 3/27/1998 1 
  
The Council held that Article 11 of University Law, which required all 
universities to allow military counselors on campus, was unconstitutional. 
At the time, about 5000 of these counselors were placed in all college 
dormitories in Taiwan, and they were ‘widely viewed as an instrument of 
political control’ (Ginsburg, 150). KMT, as the dominant party, had the 
interest of preserving this institution, and thus it was very likely that the 
Council was acting against KMT’s preference. According to legal scholar 
and Grand Justice Chen Shin-min, Interpretation No. 450 is radical 
because it marks the Council’s unprecedented move in conferring a higher 
priority to university self-governance than the principle of legal 
reservation. Also, it expands the scope of self-governance from teaching 
activities to including institutional management.108 
1 
471 12/18/1998 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
478 3/19/1999 4 
  
This case is about protection of basic rights but it does not involve a 
politically salient issue. 
0 
                                                          
108 Shin-min Chen, “Which is More Important – University Self-Governance or The Principle of Legal Reservation? (in 
Chinese)”, National Policy Foundation Commentary, August 9, 2001, http://www.npf.org.tw/print?sid=696/. 
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Indepen-
dence 
472 1/29/1999 3 
  
The Council supported a compulsory national health insurance program. 
The case does not seem to be politically salient. There was no evidence 
that KMT was against it. 
0 
499 3/24/2000 4 
  
Arguably the most important constitutional case in Taiwan, the Council 
declared unconstitutional the National Assembly’s 1999 constitutional 
amendments, through which the National Assembly’s delegates attempted 
to extend their tenure for two extra years and offered no roadmap to the 
institution’s supposed total replacement by the Legislative Yuan. The 
delegates’ (both KMT and DPP members) fight for survival contradicted 
their respective parties’ shared official position on the issue. As such, 
although Interpretation No. 499 is said to ‘mark the peak of judicial 
power’ (Hwang, Liao, and Chang, 76), the decision itself is not a 
demonstration of the Council’s independence because it was acting 
against KMT’s and DPP’s delegates in the National Assembly but not 
KMT and DPP themselves. Nevertheless, the timing of the Interpretation 
was telling. Media reports on the issue connected it with the 2000 
presidential election, in that the public’s outrage over the constitutional 
amendments and the parties’ (but especially KMT’s) inability to resolve 
the issue would certainly hurt their prospects in the event.109 As such, 
there would be tremendous political demand for the Council to rule 
against the delegates before the presidential election on March 18th 2000. 
It turned out that although the Council ruled against the delegates, the 
Interpretation was released, likely strategically, a few days after the 
election. It is the timing of the event that demonstrated its independence. 
1 
520 1/15/2001 2,5 
  
The Council basically ruled that the Executive Yuan led by President 
Chen could not independently decide to halt the construction of a nuclear 
plant, and must instead seek approval from the Legislative Yuan (where 
KMT still had a majority). By this time power diffusion had been 
achieved between KMT and DPP, so there is no ground to decide whether 
the Council demonstrated independence. 
0 
523 3/22/2001 1,4 
  
See Interpretation 384. 1 
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Independence: 
-1: The case/Interpretation demonstrates the Council’s subservience to the dominant party or the party-state.  
0: The case/Interpretation does not offer any conclusion regarding the Council’s independence. 
1: The case/Interpretation demonstrates the Council’s independence from the dominant party and the party-state. 
 
  
                                                          
109 “Sugar-Coating the Self-Serving Scheme, and the Rough Road to Reform (in Chinese),” China Times, September 5, 1999, 
http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/assembly/88090509.htm. Ming-hui Peng, “How Voters May Redeem Themselves Amidst 
The Self-Serving Term Extension Case (in Chinese),” (blog) http://www.reocities.com/Athens/Delphi/6349/bonn06-04.htm. 
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